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This thesis focuses on defending the claim that contemporary philosophy deals 
inadequately with issues of public concern. Beginning with an Aristotelian distinction 
between dialectical and rhetorical argument, I argue that philosophers have come to view 
the former as the only acceptable approach while unduly condemning the latter. I contend 
that this is a mistake, and that stereotypically deceptive rhetoric is not representative of 
all rhetorical argumentation. I argue further that dialectical argument succumbs to an 
effectiveness problem concerning audience uptake and shows great disrespect for the 
lived experience of audience members. I show this through analysis of two paradigm 
arguments in moral philosophy: Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion” and 
Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Finally, I argue that philosophers 
dealing with issues of public concern ought to empathize with audiences to construct 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
1.1. Argument in Philosophy 
Argument is a powerful form of communication found almost everywhere in 
academic, intellectual, and popular culture. Politicians in favour of increased gun control 
cite the disturbing frequency and devastating consequences of shooting sprees as good 
reasons for limiting the access of individuals to firearms. Archaeologists appeal to 
evidence gathered through processes such as radioactive carbon dating in order to 
establish that a given fossil discovery can be dated to the Jurassic Period as opposed to 
the Cretaceous. When a university increases tuition costs, administrators offer the 
increased ability to provide services and quality educational opportunities for students as 
justification for having done so. Proponents of all sorts of positions regularly strive to 
have us believe that theirs is the position we ought to accept and act upon. In each case, 
advocates for a position make use of argument. They offer reasons and evidence which 
purport to justify their claims. No matter who one is, they have surely been exposed to 
argument on a constant basis in their everyday lives. 
In philosophy, though, argument is something more. Argument does not just play 
a role in philosophy, it is the central component of the discipline and the main method of 
inquiry employed by the philosopher. As Robert Martin puts it, philosophers rely on 
argument so significantly because it is the main method by which we test the value of our 
beliefs.1 Unlike scientists, philosophers do not work in laboratories or conduct 
experiments. As such, argument has become the laboratory of the philosopher.2 In 
                                                          
1 Robert M. Martin, For the Sake of Argument: How to do Philosophy (Peterborough, ON: Broadview 
Press, 2017), 12. 
2 Ibid. 
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offering arguments to others, philosophers intend that they might think more deeply 
about their own beliefs and assumptions, and about whether they are beliefs and 
assumptions worth holding. Though we may use thought experiments in order to 
motivate deeper thinking, philosophers do not develop empirical evidence of our own. 
Argument allows the philosopher to draw important and meaningful conclusions, make 
sense of curious facts, implore others to set a high standard for their willingness to 
believe, and advocate for positions in a manner that they believe any given person ought 
to accept. 
The goal of a philosophy professor is to teach students to think like a philosopher. 
In order to think like a philosopher, one must come to have an intimate understanding of 
argument, both good and bad. While other academics and the general public employ 
argument, they have merely picked up on it over time. Both groups have only a basic 
acquaintance with argument, focusing almost entirely on the content of arguments and far 
less so on their structure. Further, when it comes to other academics, a deep 
understanding of how argument works is not part of their fundamental training. Though 
historians, for example, make and examine arguments, there is no amount of time taken 
in history courses to teach students about argument as a method of inquiry.  
Philosophers, by comparison, are trained in the proper use of argument, in 
accordance with a rigorous set of rules, from their very first exposure to the discipline. 
Would-be philosophy students are immediately taught to appreciate how philosophical 
argument works so that they may be prepared for the breadth of topics discussed as they 
become further involved in the discipline. Philosophers are interested in the structure of 
any given argument at least as much as they are its content. Because of this, students have 
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instilled in them a strict understanding of, and respect for, logical validity as the chief 
method by which the value of an argument is judged. They are taught to examine 
arguments closely for logical errors and to avoid these same errors in constructing 
arguments of their own. 
Properly understood, all argument aims at persuasion. When philosophers offer 
arguments, they do so with the hope that those exposed to them will accept that the 
position advocated for is one they ought to hold as well.3 Unlike most arguers, though, 
philosophers have the advantage of intimately understanding logic and the structure of 
good arguments. Philosophers attempt to construct arguments using the best reasons they 
have in favour of the conclusion that they wish their audience to accept. They are guided 
in this process by their mastery of argument. In contemporary academic philosophy, 
however, what counts as a good reason is limited to those reasons that the perfectly 
rational audience would accept. These reasons are those which ought to be accepted by 
anyone, regardless of the experiences that they have had which make their lives unique 
and affect the manner in which they analyze and judge arguments. Reasons which do not 
fit into this category are considered unacceptable. To employ such reasons, according to 
the philosophical community, is to engage in the wrong kind of persuasion. 
The philosophical conception of argument is challenged, however, by a group of 
scholars known as “argumentation theorists.” Argumentation Theory is a diverse field of 
study which draws upon such disciplines as philosophy, linguistics, social psychology, 
rhetoric, communication theory, and discourse analysis.4 According to contemporary 
                                                          
3 Ibid., 11. 
4 Michael A. Gilbert, Arguing with People (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2014), 14. 
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Argumentation Theory, argument is a far broader enterprise than philosophers recognize. 
Arguments, from this point of view, are not just abstract constructs which offer reasons in 
support of a conclusion. This is just one of many ways in which argument can be 
employed. From this perspective, argument can also be used to establish agreement, 
instill emotion, or cause people to behave in a particular manner. Michael Gilbert, a 
philosopher and leading scholar in this field, describes argument as a process which is 
fundamentally social and characterized by a multitude of aspects.5 Some of these aspects, 
he says, are linear and logical (in keeping with the traditional philosophical conception) 
but others fall outside of these categories.6 Argumentation Theory, he says, “focuses on 
argument as it takes place between real people in real situations.”7 This sits in stark 
contrast to the manner in which Philosophy and Critical Thinking courses cover 
arguments as abstract constructions best understood as almost mathematical in nature. 
In this thesis, I intend to argue that there is something valuable to be taken from 
the broader conception of argument proposed by argumentation theorists and that it really 
is the case, as Argumentation Theory holds, that the traditional philosophical approach to 
argument is too narrow. I believe that Argumentation Theory presents a strong challenge 
to the traditional conception, giving good reason to believe that such an approach is 
ineffective. The traditional philosophical conception of argument, I contend, is indeed too 
narrow. This conception privileges an incredibly specific sort of audience and, as such, is 
ineffective for a significant group of individuals who make up larger public audiences.  
                                                          
5 “Argumentation Theory,” Michael A. Gilbert, A World of Many Facets, York University, accessed June 
7, 2017, http://gilbert.info.yorku.ca/argumentation-theory/. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Gilbert, Arguing with People, 14. 
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Approaching argument from the broader conception offered by argumentation 
theorists, however, allows us to take a much more diverse range of audiences into 
account. On this approach, we can offer arguments which will effectively persuade these 
audiences. Such arguments will offer respect for the fact that audience members are 
situated individuals, characterized by lived experience, whose judgements may admit of 
non-rational factors. That is, we can offer arguments that speak to actual people rather 
than the philosophically-inclined alone. Approaching argument in this manner, I will 
argue, is consistent with a position initially advocated for by Aristotle, which has either 
been forgotten, or undervalued by subsequent scholars. 
I will further argue that, on this approach, empathy is among the most important 
tools available to arguers when it comes to the construction of arguments. Coming to a 
deep understanding of the positions of those who comprise particular audiences is of the 
utmost importance when constructing arguments that are meant to speak to them. 
Empathizing with others can provide us with insight concerning not just what their 
reaction will be to the positions for which philosophers might advocate. We can learn 
also why they feel as they do about such positions and what it is about the issue at hand 
that they consider to be important. This understanding of others, I contend, can be an 
incredibly helpful tool in constructing the most effectively persuasive and respectful 
arguments possible. 
Finally, I will offer an alternative interpretation of Plato, within which Socrates 
appears to engage with his audience in this broader manner to at least some extent. While 
he is well-known as a gadfly, I contend that it is the side of Socrates that is akin to a 
midwife on which we should focus. Rather than the man who irritated those around him 
10 
to the point of his own death, this Socrates is a more attentive and aware educator. From 
this perspective, Socrates did not just engage in philosophical discussion with others to 
show them the faults in their thinking. He did so to help them think more deeply about 
certain issues, and develop meaningful understanding as a result, while constantly 
maintaining an awareness of their emotional state. While contemporary philosophers are 
skilled at embodying the gadfly, I argue, they do not properly balance it against the role 
of the midwife, as Socrates did.
11 
Chapter II: Aristotle and Two Kinds of Argument 
2.1. Dialectical Argument 
Aristotle was the first philosopher to analyze the nature of argument and, thus, the 
earliest argumentation theorist. While Socrates and Plato, among others, certainly made 
use of argument prior to Aristotle, his is the first thorough analysis into how argument is 
used and in what circumstances we ought to employ different sorts of argument. As such, 
Aristotle’s analysis underlies a vast portion of the work done in Argumentation Theory. 
His work forms the basis upon which many subsequent authors have constructed 
positions concerning the way we ought to understand argument, as well as the manner in 
which it might be legitimately used. 
Among the major contributions made to Argumentation Theory by Aristotle is the 
distinction between dialectic and rhetoric (or dialectical and rhetorical argument) in On 
Rhetoric. While Plato had previously written about the dangers of rhetorical argument in 
Gorgias, describing it as an immoral and irresponsible strategy concerned only with 
flattery and not with logic or truth, Aristotle’s view here is decidedly more positive.8 In 
On Rhetoric, rhetorical argument is presented as a perfectly acceptable counterpart to 
dialectical argument. Properly understood, rhetorical argument could be used to great 
effect in attempts to persuade far more diverse audiences than dialectical argument would 
be capable of persuading.9  
                                                          
8 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 2nd ed., trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), x. 
9 Ibid., 1355a12-1355b14, 1356a7-1356b8. 
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For Aristotle, dialectical argument takes as its goal the discovery of truth, and it 
aims to accomplish this goal by way of logic and reason alone.10 Dialectical argument 
involves the presentation of premises intended to provide support for conclusions, and is 
often but not always, characterized by a back-and-forth discussion involving multiple 
parties. In such cases, individuals share their own argument in favour of a position with 
their fellow arguers, who subsequently offer critique in the form of counterarguments, 
objections, and accusations of logical error. While individual arguers often advocate for 
different points of view, their goal is that the view which best captures truth, whatever 
that view may be, will prevail in the end.11  
This process is not unlike a trial by ordeal. Rather than determine the guilt or 
innocence of the accused by their ability (or failure) to survive great dangers, 
philosophers determine the merit of arguments by whether they stand up to the strongest 
criticisms. When all is said and done, that argument which best stands up to criticism 
among alternatives is the one that ought to be provisionally accepted. Arguments that are 
unable to stand up to this criticism are expected to be revised in such a way as to deal 
with their faults, and perhaps be discussed later, or if revision of this sort is impossible, 
abandoned entirely.12  
In his translation of Aristotle’s work, George Kennedy offers a description of the 
process by which this sort of argument occurs. Dialectical argument, he says, begins with 
the statement of a thesis (e.g. “Might makes right”) by one party, followed by some other 
                                                          
10 Michael A. Gilbert, Coalescent Argumentation (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 
Publishers, 1997), 4; Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 28. 
11 Martin, For the Sake of Argument, 11. 
12 Gilbert, Coalescent Argumentation, 3. 
13 
party’s attempting to refute that thesis by asking “yes” or “no” questions. Successful 
refutation of a thesis involves the original party being led to accept a contradiction or 
logical impossibility resulting from their answers to these questions. It remains possible, 
however, that one could offer a defense through further argument which might allow 
them to avoid logical errors, thus “winning” the argument.13 
This description fits the structure of Platonic dialogues. Socrates would find 
himself in conversation with an individual or group discussing the true meaning of 
abstract concepts like justice. A suggestion as to the definition of justice might be made 
by one of Socrates’ partners in conversation, at which point Socrates would ask 
prompting questions that tended to lead to the discovery of a contradiction. Polemarchus, 
for example, suggested that justice should be understood as defined by Simonides: giving 
to each person what they are owed.14  
In response to Polemarchus, Socrates asks whether one ought to return a weapon 
to a man who initially gave it to them for safe-keeping. Is the man owed the return of his 
weapon? Polemarchus agrees without hesitation, but Socrates immediately points out that 
this leads him to accept a contradiction. If one must return the weapon to its owner, but 
the owner intends to do wrong with it, then it seems that to give this man what he is owed 
would be unjust.15 This process continues, with Polemarchus and others offering 
amended, or entirely different, definitions of justice to be put to the test by Socrates’ 
questions. They attempt to offer defenses through further argument, but as is usually the 
case in discussion with Socrates, no conclusion emerges as the clear answer. 
                                                          
13 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 28. 
14 Plato, The Republic, 331e-332a. 
15 Ibid., 332a-b. 
14 
While Kennedy’s characterization is an accurate description of philosophy as it 
occurred in Ancient Greece, it does not account for the vast array of other circumstances 
in which dialectical argument can also occur. It is not the case that dialectical argument is 
possible only in a face-to-face setting or in direct conversation with others. Indeed, 
dialectical argument can occur entirely in the writing of a single individual. A paper in 
which one adequately portrays both arguments for their own position, as well as 
arguments and objections which may be offered by imagined interlocutors, is indeed an 
instance of dialectical argument.  
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion” is an excellent example of 
exactly this approach. Thomson’s is a particularly strong example because she begins by 
offering the argument of her opponent before offering a counterargument which seems to 
show that the initial argument ought not to be accepted. Those against abortion, she says, 
often present the following argument, or some version of it: 
 
1. Fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. 
2. Every person has a right to life. 
3. While a potential mother may have a right to decide what happens with 
her body, this is outweighed by a fetus’ right to life. 
4. Therefore, abortion is impermissible; fetuses cannot be aborted.16 
 
 
According to Thomson, however, this argument is flawed. Even if one grants the 
controversial first premise, she says, the third premise is simply untrue. Thomson claims 
to show that this is the case by invoking a thought experiment in which an individual 
finds themselves attached to a famous violinist for a period of at least nine months. This 
                                                          
16 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1971): 
47-48, accessed June 7, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265091. 
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is supposed to allow the violinist to survive some otherwise terminal illness. The 
suggestion that one could not refuse to continue being attached to the violinist, Thomson 
argues, is absurd. Bodily autonomy, she believes, trumps the violinist’s right to life.17 
Thus, Thomson offers a counterargument: 
 
1. Fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. 
2. Every person has a right to life. 
3. But, a fetus’ right to life does not outweigh a potential mother’s right to 
bodily autonomy. 




While I will deal more thoroughly with Thomson’s argument in due course, what 
is important to note at this point is that both her argument, and the argument she 
attributes to those against abortion are paradigm examples of dialectical argument. Each 
is purely logical in form; despite discussing an issue in which one could employ graphic 
and emotive examples and language, neither does. All relevant information is presented 
in a matter-of-fact way and neither attempts to move beyond that which is firmly rooted 
in logic and reason.  
More than this, Thomson’s article is an example of the dialectical process at work 
in a manner decidedly lacking in immediate, face-to-face discourse. Thomson presents 
the argument of her imagined opponent before offering her own counterargument. As the 
article continues, she presents, and subsequently addresses, potential objections to her 
own argument. This all occurs on paper in much the same way that it might occur in 
direct discussion with a fellow philosopher or academic. Thomson’s article is one that 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 48-49. 
18 Ibid., 49. 
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precisely follows the process of dialectical argument in the current tradition, as 
understood by Aristotle and philosophers generally. Further, Thomson has imagined an 
audience at whom her arguments are directed. This is an audience composed only of 
perfectly rational actors. Because Thomson captures the dialectical process in a manner 
lacking in direct interaction beyond the imagined interlocutor, I contend that Kennedy’s 
characterization of dialectical argument should be seen as most applicable to Ancient 
Greek philosophy but somewhat narrow as it concerns the contemporary practices of 
philosophy. 
Individual arguments, like the example of Thomson’s above, are the primary 
focus of the philosopher. That is, philosophers consider only the written or spoken series 
of premises offered in support of a conclusion to be important. When analyzing the 
success or failure of any given argument on this approach, one must only consider the 
extent to which that argument itself adheres to certain logical rules. Is the argument 
valid? Do the premises which are intended to support the conclusion actually do so, and if 
they do, how much support do they offer? Is it the case that the truth of the premises 
guarantees the truth of the conclusion, or is this an argument to a probable conclusion? 
Are the premises, in fact, true or likely true? These are the questions one should be asking 
herself, according to the dialectician, when attempting to determine the merit of any 
given dialectical argument. Taking any more than this into account is to go beyond logic 
and reason. It should not matter, for example, who happens to be offering a particular 
argument; the argument ought to stand on its own merits. A sound argument just is a 
proper one whether offered by an esteemed philosopher, a first-year student, or a reviled 
dictator. Nor should it matter to whom arguments are offered. If one is confronted with a 
17 
sound argument which contradicts their beliefs, the dialectician holds that they ought to 
accept that argument as if by logical compulsion.
 
2.2. Rhetorical Argument 
Rhetorical argument, by contrast, does not take the discovery of truth to be its 
chief goal, nor does it limit itself to the use of logic and reason alone. Instead, rhetorical 
arguments are constructed in such a way as to persuade an audience to accept the position 
for which the arguer advocates. The best rhetorical arguer, for Aristotle, was not one who 
could successfully persuade any audience but the one who was able to see the available 
means of persuasion in all instances.19 Further, while Aristotle certainly intended that 
rhetorical argument would be grounded in truth (particularly in order to avoid its misuse), 
he also recognized that, presented in the straightforward manner of dialectical argument, 
truth would not be persuasive to all audiences.20 For rhetorical argument, then, truth is a 
value but not the value in the manner that persuasion is. Indeed, for Aristotle, there is a 
distinction between that which is persuasive, and that which is only apparently 
persuasive. To be truly persuasive, an argument must be valid; invalid arguments 
delivered in a rhetorical manner are only apparently persuasive.21 
While it is surely the case that dialectical argument aims to have individuals adopt 
particular positions as well, this is not its chief goal. Acceptance of positions, in 
dialectical argument, is merely a by-product of those positions being true. Dialecticians 
take for granted that we will, or at least ought to, accept positions grounded in sound 
                                                          
19 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1355b14-1355b1. 
20 Gilbert, Coalescent Argumentation, 4; Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 14-5, 28. 
21 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1355b14, note 28.  
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arguments. Assuming that there are no major problems with the argument, we must 
accept it. Once it is evident that an argument does, in fact, capture truth, the dialectician 
expects that those exposed to it will accept the relevant position.  
With rhetorical argument, though, Aristotle recognized that the sorts of judgments 
we make when met with attempts at persuasion are not always entirely rational.22 Just 
because we might have knowledge of the truth, he says, does not mean that we can 
effectively persuade others to accept it on that basis alone.23 Thus, to limit attempts at 
persuasion to logic and reason alone would be to ignore that strictly logical manoeuvres 
will not always be successful, and that a broader approach may be much more effective at 
persuading individuals to adopt positions grounded in truth. 
Thus, rhetorical argument, for Aristotle, is to be used to persuade those who will 
not be persuaded by dialectical argument alone. When faced with an audience of well-
educated individuals (particularly in philosophy), one might be perfectly capable of 
persuading them to accept that a given position is true purely on the basis of the argument 
put before them and its adherence to formal validity. When attempting to persuade a 
larger, public audience, however, this approach may not suffice. Not everyone is 
educated in such a way as to understand why logical validity ought to result in their 
accepting some position, nor does everyone value logical structure as philosophers do. 
Indeed, it is important to recognize that many are simply uninterested in becoming so 
educated, or may find themselves in circumstances where they have never had the 
opportunity. Rather than hope for one’s audience to be, or to become, the sort of people 
                                                          
22 Gilbert, Coalescent Argumentation, 4; Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1355b1-1356a7, 39 note 43. 
23 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1355a12. 
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moved to belief by logical validity alone, Aristotle thought it appropriate to employ 
rhetorical argument in these instances.24 
There are, for Aristotle, three modes of persuasion open to the rhetorician. The 
first, logos, has to do with the exact sorts of arguments prized by dialecticians. These are 
arguments which are concerned exclusively with logic and reason. It is because of the 
continued inclusion of this mode in rhetorical argument that Aristotle referred to 
rhetorical argument as an offshoot of dialectical argument.25 Rhetorical argument, in this 
sense, does not intend to replace dialectical argument with something entirely non-
rational. Instead, it is intended to complement logical strength with an approach more 
likely to engage and persuade public audiences. 
Rhetorical argument, then, includes, at the very least, similarly structured 
arguments as can be found in dialectical argument. Where it differs, however, is that it 
considers the way in which public audiences are composed of a broad range of people 
from all walks of life. Many of these people may lack education in, or be otherwise 
unfamiliar with, philosophy. As such, these audiences are likely to react quite differently 
than philosophers to the intricacies of logic. Keeping in mind that non-philosophical 
audiences may not be persuaded by the exact same sort of arguments that might be found 
in dialectical argument, Aristotle introduced the enthymeme as a part of rhetorical 
argument.26 
For Aristotle, the enthymeme was important in grounding rhetorical arguments in 
truth and in making truth approachable to public audiences. As compared to the 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 1355a12, 1356b11-14, 42 note 55. 
25 Ibid., 1356a7. 
26 Ibid., 1356a7-1357a14, 42 note 55. 
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syllogisms characteristic of dialectical arguments, he says, enthymemes are often 
constructed with fewer premises leading to the same conclusions. According to Aristotle, 
this is the result of there being no need to explicitly state premises which might be seen 
as obvious and superfluous by members of the general public.27 Aristotle offers an 
example of an appropriate time to leave premises implicit when offering arguments to 
public audiences, saying that “to show that Dorieus has won a contest with a crown it is 
enough to have said that he has won the Olympic games, and there is no need to add that 
the Olympic games have a crown as the prize; for everybody knows that.”28 Aristotle 
intended, Kennedy says, to have rhetorical argument avoid the potentially negative 
outcomes of presenting dialectical argument to a public audience: their impatience with 
statements taken to be “given” in ordinary discourse (which they might take as 
undermining their intelligence) and the “tiresome pedantry” associated with intricate 
logic.29 
The second mode of persuasion, ethos, is concerned with the credibility of 
speakers. As Aristotle says, we are more likely to believe those who we consider to be 
trustworthy and knowledgeable when they claim that we ought to accept some position or 
other, and we will take their word concerning a broad range of topics.30 Dialectical 
argument, it ought to be said, does deal with ethos insofar as it tells us to be wary of 
claims made by authority figures. We should not be moved to accept an argument merely 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 1357a13. 
28 Ibid., 1357a13. 
29 Ibid., 42 note 55. 
30 Ibid., 1356a3-4. 
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because its proponent happens to be an authority of some sort.31 Rather, we must do our 
due diligence to determine whether the perceived authority figure is one who ought to be 
trusted on this matter.32 This warning is the extent to which ethos is dealt with by 
dialectical argument. The potential benefits of an arguer gaining the trust of her audience, 
and proving her knowledge about the matter at hand, are overlooked. 
The final mode of persuasion, pathos, deals with the fact that all audiences 
experience emotion, and that such experiences can affect their judgments. This does not 
just pertain to the emotional reactions that a speaker may awaken in audience members as 
a result of their argument but to the way in which speakers must be cognizant of the 
emotional state of those they address.33 Aristotle recognized that we do not react in the 
same manner to an argument when we are angry as we do when joyful or depressed.34 
Each person is situated within a very specific context of lived experienced and emotional 
states, and arguers must recognize this in order to give their arguments as strong a 
persuasive force as they are able. An arguer’s ability to recognize the situated nature, and 
emotional state, of her audience, concerning the issues at hand, and the arguments she 
constructs in relation to them, is crucial to the process of persuasion. 
Aristotle is quite right that it is sometimes the case that just the facts of the matter 
are not enough to persuade individuals to accept the positions that naturally follow from 
them. Take climate change, for example. Scientists tell us that there is an overwhelming 
amount of evidence that climate change is a real and present danger. In order to avoid the 
                                                          
31 William Hughes and Jonathan Lavery, Critical Thinking: An Introduction to the Basic Skills, 7th ed. 
(Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2015), 131-133 
32 Ibid., 144-145. 
33 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, x, 15, 1378a8. 
34 Ibid., 1356a5. 
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most catastrophic dangers associated with climate change, it is imperative that as many 
people as possible believe it to be a major problem. The more people who accept this 
position, the more likely that greater efforts will be taken to protect the planet. While it is 
certainly the case that some individuals (most likely scientists and philosophers) will be 
persuaded to believe this by dialectical arguments alone, this is not the case for everyone. 
There are, indeed, many people to whom merely reporting the facts of the matter in 
dialectical form holds little weight. Even well-educated individuals, in disciplines not 
having to do with the science involved, may be unmoved by these sorts of arguments.  
Polar bears serve as something of a poster child for the negative effects of climate 
change on both the planet and its inhabitants. Much work has been done to show that 
climate change has had a significantly negative effect on polar bears, with the threat of 
extinction becoming all too real.35 Because the Arctic is warming at a rate much faster 
than other areas, the habitat of the polar bear has been dramatically altered. Sea ice is 
shrinking drastically and decreasing in thickness on an annual basis, at rates much faster 
than previously expected, with projections indicating that this will only get worse over 
time.36 Polar bears depend heavily on sea ice to access their main sources of food, as well 
as for mating and travel purposes.37 According to one scientific study, polar bears in the 
Western Hudson Bay area are already showing “declines in body condition, reproductive 
success, survival, and population abundance.”38 The indication to this point is that these 
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declines are the result of increased difficulties in sourcing food, and prolonged periods of 
open-water travel while fasting.39 Reports indicate that some polar bears have even 
resorted to cannibalism in order to make up for decreasing ability to hunt the prey they 
normally would.40 
Given this information, it is clear that a major and unfortunate change is occurring 
in the habitat of polar bears as a direct result of climate change. These facts, presented in 
a purely dialectical argument may, as I have said, be enough to persuade some 
individuals. But, for many, mere reports of the facts will not be enough to engage them. 
For these same people, however, there is a different and more powerful approach to 
presenting evidence which may be more effective. One can engage with and recognize 
the power that the emotions of one’s audience have both when it comes to the judgments 
they make about arguments, and their willingness to accept them.  
It is one thing to be told that polar bears have decreasing access to food, and that 
they starve as a result. It is another to be shown just how drastic the effects of climate 
change on these animals have been. It may indeed be more persuasive for this group not 
just to hear about the effects of climate change but to see actual examples of emaciated 
polar bears stranded on miniscule ice flow with nowhere to go. It might be more 
persuasive still to evoke feelings of sympathy for polar bears by connecting the dire 
situation in which they find themselves to the worries that people have about the well-
being of their family and friends. Asking them to imagine what it would be like if people 
they care about were facing similar difficulties, in terms of finding food and shelter, 
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might lead audience members to recognize the significance of the situation. This 
approach is likely to affect an audience’s judgment on the issue of climate change in a 
positive way and may increase their willingness to accept that this is a major problem 
worth doing something about. 
It must further be made clear that Aristotle does not advocate just any sort of 
rhetorical argument. That an argument involves strategies which engage with ethos and 
pathos is not enough to say that it is an example of proper rhetorical argument. Indeed, 
just as dialectical argument can be valid or invalid, there are both acceptable and 
unacceptable rhetorical arguments. I believe, then, that rhetorical argument is best viewed 
on a spectrum. At one end of this spectrum, we could expect to find those arguments 
grounded in truth and factual evidence which aim to strengthen their persuasive force by 
recognizing the importance of (and thus employing) strategies which are, for example, 
evocative of emotion.  
At the opposite end of this spectrum are those arguments which are examples of 
what might be called “stereotypical rhetoric.” This is the sort of rhetorical argument that 
Aristotle would certainly have condemned. For those who employ this sort of argument, 
facts are seen as malleable or (if it is in the service of effective persuasion) are 
completely ignored. Those who partake in this sort of rhetorical argument ignore the 
importance that Aristotle placed on truth in attempts to persuade.41 Whereas truth is 
central to proper rhetorical argument on Aristotle’s description, here it is only as valuable 
as it is useful in persuasion. If an audience would be more receptive to outright 
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falsehoods, then, rhetorical argument, on this end of the spectrum, would embrace 
deception.  
Aristotle was certainly aware that this approach to rhetoric could be employed by 
those acting unjustly, and that it could result in great harm. It was his position, however, 
that this was no more a problem for rhetoric than for anything else which may be abused 
by those with ill intentions. For Aristotle, rhetorical argument was a morally neutral tool 
that could only be judged insofar as particular individuals chose to employ it justly or 
unjustly.42 One would be wrong to cast all rhetorical argument in a negative light on the 
basis that it might be misused by some arguers. 
Perhaps the most obvious examples of stereotypical rhetorical argument come 
from speeches made by politicians. While it would not be accurate to paint all politicians 
with this broad brush, public opinion leans heavily toward the perception of politicians as 
“liars and cheats” who cannot be trusted. The stereotypical politician is a master of 
deceptive rhetoric. They are concerned only with manipulating audiences to accept their 
way of looking at things, so that they may subsequently win elections, come to power, 
and attempt to shape the world as they see fit. This sort of individual has no issue with 
deception so long as persuasion is more effective when they trade in falsehoods rather 
than in truth.  
President Donald Trump is particularly guilty of employing rhetorical argument in 
this exact manner. It is not difficult to find a speech given by President Trump in which 
he offers purported evidence to justify a claim or action which is later found to have been 
heavily exaggerated, or altogether falsified. At the same time as appearing to be 
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grounding his claims in evidence, President Trump relies on appeals to ethos and pathos 
to seize the attention of those in his audience. This approach has allowed him to capture a 
fervent and unrelenting audience of supporters, despite his willingness to manipulate and 
deceive them at every turn. 
Take, for example, the speech given by President Trump on June 1, 2017, within 
which he expressed his reasons for withdrawing the United States from the Paris Climate 
Accord. With this speech, President Trump’s aim is to provide support for the view that 
withdrawal from the Paris Accord is the only acceptable solution on the basis that its 
terms are strongly biased against the welfare of the United States and its citizens. On a 
surface-level reading of President Trump’s speech, he certainly does seem to offer 
arguments which engage with logos. He offers reasons concerning the outrageous 
expense that the Paris Accord imposes on the United States, and the potential for lost jobs 
as a result of continued compliance. Upon a closer analysis of the purported facts and 
figures offered by President Trump, though, deception is rampant.  
One of President Trump’s major points against compliance has to do with the 
allegedly unfair nature of The Paris Climate Accord. This agreement, he says, punishes 
and disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other nations, without 
imposing any meaningful obligations on those nations who are leaders in pollution.43 As 
an example of a leading polluter, President Trump points to China, which he claims will 
be able to increase its emissions over the next 13 years with no repercussion. This is 
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simply incorrect. Not only has China pledged to lower its emissions over that 13-year 
period, it is on track to beat that target date and, thus, overachieve goals for reduction of 
CO2 emissions.
44 President Trump would have his audience believe, though, that China 
wishes to increase its emissions as much as possible while making the United States 
subsidize the resulting environmental cost, and that many other nations have the same 
desire. 
This is perfectly in line with a consistent claim made by President Trump 
throughout the speech. According to President Trump, the Paris Accord imposes 
particular obligations on the United States alone, effectively allowing other nations to run 
amok. The agreement is less about the climate, he argues, than it is about other countries 
gaining financial advantages over the United States. For example, the United States is not 
allowed to develop clean coal or build new coal plants, he says, while China and India 
will be allowed to substantially increase their coal production. President Trump claims 
that this is just another instance of outsourcing much-needed American jobs to foreign 
countries. Money that ought to be invested in the United States is being forcibly taken 
away by this unfair agreement.45 
Here too, President Trump is deceiving his audience. To claim that the Paris 
Accord imposes anything on the United States or any other country is patently false. 
There are no explicit bans on coal production in the United States, as President Trump 
claims.46 Even if such regulations were included in the agreement, they would not be 
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binding in any way. This is because, as many analysts point out, the Paris Accord is 
voluntary in nature.47 Even the nationally determined emissions cuts are merely 
suggested goals which are not strictly enforced. It is up to individual countries to set the 
goals they are comfortable with working toward, and which they consider realistic.48 
Again, though, President Trump wants his audience to believe that there is an outside 
force working to hold the United States down so that others may flourish. To withdraw 
from the Paris Accord is to escape the oppression of this force. 
President Trump’s purported evidence, and good reasons for withdrawal, are 
constantly bolstered by engagement with ethos and pathos. He attempts to situate himself 
as a trustworthy authority figure who is doing incredible things as president and, as such, 
ought to be trusted on this decision as well. He cites the rapid growth of the economy 
(over three trillion dollars in stock market value) that has occurred under his watch as 
well as the more than one million jobs created since his being elected.49 To those unaware 
of the facts of the matter, this appears to be some indication that President Trump knows 
what he is doing and that there may be good reason to trust his most recent decision as 
well. Once again, though, his claims are less than accurate. As for job creation, President 
Trump’s figure is exaggerated and his taking credit is erroneous. Just over 805,000 jobs 
were created in the United States between January and May 2017, and many of these are 
more accurately attributed to the Obama Administration.50  
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As it concerns pathos, President Trump expertly includes references to how much 
he cares about the American people as often as he possibly can. He loves American 
workers, he says, and refuses to accept the disadvantages that continued compliance with 
the draconian Paris Accord will force them to absorb.51 President Trump paints those 
who supposedly benefit from this unfair agreement as having been overjoyed by the 
United States’ initial decision to join the Paris Accord and inflict upon itself a major 
economic wound. These countries, he says, “applauded when we signed the Paris 
Agreement — they went wild; they were so happy — for the simple reason that it put our 
country, the United States of America, which we all love [emphasis added], at a very, 
very big economic disadvantage.”52 President Trump continuously emphasizes just how 
much this agreement makes the country he loves, and the people within it, suffer while 
others do nothing but benefit. These countries are laughing at the United States, he says, 
and he will not allow this to continue.53 
This speech is not unique to President Trump. His approach is almost exactly in 
keeping with the unjust use of rhetorical argument that Aristotle condemned as being 
capable of doing great societal harm.54 The arguments that can be identified in President 
Trump’s speech lack substance. While they engage with ethos and pathos, they do so as 
an attempt to hide that almost all the evidence offered ends up being misrepresented, 
exaggerated, and falsified. This sits in stark contrast to the manner in which Aristotle 
intended rhetorical argument to be used. Ethos and pathos were not meant to be tools to 
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deceive and distract from an arguer’s poor engagement with logos but to strengthen an 
argument grounded in good logic, and to make it more accessible to broader, public 
audiences. 
In contrast to the above, Dr. Martin Luther King’s “Letter from a Birmingham 
Jail” is an outstanding example of rhetorical argument. No doubt it is one which would 
gain Aristotle’s approval. Having been incarcerated for his involvement in civil rights 
demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, King took the time to respond to a particular 
group of detractors. This group, composed of eight white Alabama ministers, took issue 
with the civil rights demonstrations organized by King. The civil rights movement, they 
believed, was getting out of hand and moving too quickly.55 While these ministers were, 
indeed, in agreement with King, as it concerned the immorality of racism and 
segregation, their position was that he had not responded to these injustices properly. 
Demonstrations organized by King, they said, were “ill-timed and ill-advised.”56  Rather 
than take such immediate and drastic action, the black community needed to be more 
patient. This problem ought to be solved with a respect for law in the courts and through 
local negotiations, not through civil disobedience.57 
In constructing his argument, then, King is presented with an audience which will 
be challenging to persuade. King need not convince these ministers of the unjust nature 
of racism and segregation; they already agree that these are immoral. Nor does he need to 
convince them that something ought to be done, as it is evident that they have a plan of 
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action in mind: everything must be solved in accordance with the law, no matter how 
long they must wait. What King must do is persuade his audience that waiting is not the 
proper course of action, and that something must be done immediately. So, while King 
very well could have presented an entirely dialectical argument, he chose, instead, to 
harness the persuasive force of rhetorical argument in order to tangle with an audience 
which would be particularly difficult to persuade by other means. 
This is not to say that King’s argument does not engage with evidence and facts. 
Indeed, King does present arguments which deal only with logic and reason. To show 
why he believes it acceptable to break some laws during a demonstration of civil 
disobedience, King offers definitions of just and unjust law and subsequently attempts to 
show that segregation laws fit into the latter category. For King, laws which are not 
democratically decided, here because the majority of potential voters were black and not 
allowed to vote, cannot be considered just. Thus, while his fellow ministers condemn him 
for breaking the law, King believes that these laws in particular ought not to be abided 
by, so long as one does so openly and with a willingness to accept the consequences of 
doing so.58 Here he attempts to show the ministers that he does indeed agree with them; 
laws ought to be respected insofar as they are just. The laws in question, however, are not 
just. This particular argument is certainly aimed to appeal to logos alone. 
King begins to engage with rhetorical tactics when he attends to the idea that the 
black community ought to wait patiently for their freedom. King does begin here with 
another appeal to logos exclusively, saying that they have waited, and for far too long. 
For 340 years, King says, his people have been in the United States, and yet, they lack the 
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same rights (both natural and constitutional) as other human beings, simply because of 
the colour of their skin. Even after more than three centuries, it is still an uphill battle to 
do something as simple as ordering a cup of coffee at a lunch counter.59 
As he moves deeper into this discussion, though, King begins to employ 
decidedly rhetorical examples. These examples are predominantly directed at pathos. 
They are evocative of deep and painful emotions on behalf of those treated so poorly, and 
tend to motivate one to take some sort of action in response. Indeed, this is exactly the 
right approach to take in attempting to persuade an audience like King’s, who lack the 
motivation to take the fight beyond the scope of the slow-moving law. Waiting any 
longer, King says, would seem acceptable to someone looking in on the situation from an 
outside perspective, precisely as these white ministers do.60 Of course those who have not 
had to suffer countless instances of police brutality, witness vicious mobs lynch their 
parents and drown their siblings, or be consistently referred to by racial slurs would not 
immediately appreciate the urgency of the cause.  
King does not just cite the anger of violence of others, which his people suffer, as 
a potential motivator. They way that the black community is made to feel inferior to 
whites is also profoundly concerning. Children, in particular, suffer from racism and 
segregation but lack the ability to understand why this is the case. King recalls his 
attempts to explain to his daughter why she could not go to Funtown, an amusement park 
advertised on television. He found his tongue twisted, he says, trying to explain to the 
crying child that she could not go to Funtown because only whites were admitted. It was 
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at this time, he says, that he could see “ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in 
her little mental sky[.]”61 King’s son, too, could not understand the reasoning behind the 
tension between the races. King recalls the difficulty of coming up with an answer when 
his son asked why “white people treat colored people so mean[.]”62  
Living as a black person in the United States, King says, is simply humiliating on 
a day-to-day basis. Signs constantly tell him where he can and cannot go and motels 
refuse to accept his patronage, leaving him sleeping uncomfortably in his car on cross-
country trips. He claims to be haunted by fear and resentment, never knowing what 
terrible thing will happen next, simply because of the colour of his skin. All of this leads 
to his feeling that he is forever fighting what he calls a “degenerating sense of 
‘nobodiness’[.]”63 That the black community must constantly undergo this treatment, he 
says, has led their “cup of endurance” to run over.64 They are no longer willing to wait 
because they are no longer willing to put themselves, and their children through such 
constant torture. 
If one is unmoved by the portion of King’s argument which appeals to logic and 
reason alone, it will be difficult not to react strongly to these examples. There is simply 
no ignoring how evocative of emotion these examples are. One cannot help but feel anger 
toward those responsible for harm and death, and pity for the children who cannot 
understand why they are hated and treated as inferior without any obvious reason. One 
might be moved, further, to ask themselves why this would be allowed to happen and 
                                                          





why something significant has not been done to change the situation. Emotional reactions 
of this sort are incredibly helpful in persuasion and are highly motivational. 
It is also important to recognize that these examples are in no way deceptive; 
King merely offers a factual description, which we know to be accurate, of the way that 
the black community was treated at the time. He does not offer these examples in order to 
manipulate his audience with falsehoods. Rather, they serve to draw focus toward the 
terrible repercussions of legalized prejudice and racism that may be difficult to 
understand for those who were largely unaffected. They offer insight to those who may 
have no idea exactly how difficult life may be from a perspective other than their own. 
For those who might agree that segregation laws are unjust but who advocate for a more 
patient approach than King’s, examples like these may serve to broaden their 
understanding of the situation and to cement just how important it is that something be 
done more immediately. King knows that he has this group of white ministers on his side 
as it concerns the immorality of legalized prejudice, but he must persuade them to accept 
that taking action sooner than later is the appropriate course of action. These examples 
are a powerful way of doing just that.
 
2.3. Rhetorical Argument in Academic Philosophy 
Aristotle, it should be said, did not focus on the differences between dialectical 
and rhetorical argument quite as much as he did their similarities.65 Michael Gilbert 
argues that this is because Aristotle did not see a sharp distinction between them. 
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Subsequent thinkers, Gilbert says, deserve credit for having widened the gap between 
Aristotle’s two sorts of argument.66 For Aristotle, the major difference between 
dialectical and rhetorical argument, is the arena in which he believed that each ought to 
be employed. Dialectical argument is to be used in instances where one intends to 
persuade those who would understand and appreciate logic for all its intricacies, while 
rhetorical argument allows us to persuade audiences who will not be moved by appeal to 
logic and reason alone. Neither, for Aristotle, was the superior sort of argument. This was 
not to be understood as a dichotomy.  
Contemporary philosophers, however, have taken this distinction to heart. In 
academic philosophy, a dichotomy is presented between the proper kind of argument – 
dialectical – and the improper kind – rhetorical. That this is the case is evidenced by the 
manner in which students are trained to become philosophers in Critical Thinking 
courses. Since these courses are often required, or at the very least strongly encouraged, 
as preparation for students interested in continuing in the discipline, they serve as an 
excellent example of the importance that philosophers place on argument as a method of 
inquiry.  
Critical Thinking courses are described as being of the utmost importance to 
students interested in philosophy. It is claimed that these courses offer students an 
introduction to the essential principles of reasoning. Critical Thinking courses are 
devoted to training students in a crucial skillset which they must possess in order to be 
successful in continued studies in philosophy: the precise analysis and criticism of 
arguments, in accordance with a strict set of logical rules. Students are taught that 
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dialectical argument is the sort of argument that they should strive to master. This is 
precisely because dialectical argument follows logical rules so well when it is properly 
employed. They are taught how to identify well-constructed dialectical arguments, as 
well as those which admit of logical error, and which must be amended or abandoned 
altogether. While this approach indicates that philosophers are happy to view dialectical 
argument as neutral, admitting of both good and bad arguments, rhetoric is presented as a 
predominantly negative argumentative strategy which ought to be avoided as much as 
possible. 
This sentiment is further expressed by the textbooks that are often assigned in 
these courses. Whether explicitly or implicitly, rhetoric is presented as an improper 
approach to argumentation. Alternatively, some textbooks deal with rhetorical argument 
merely in passing and, on occasion, completely ignore it in favour of focusing on 
dialectical argument exclusively.67 Especially in the latter case, it is evident that 
rhetorical argument is seen as having little or no value in comparison to dialectical 
argument; so little, in fact, that dealing with it in only the most basic manner (if at all) is 
considered sufficient. 
When these texts do deal with rhetorical argument, it is not presented in anywhere 
near the neutral terms that Aristotle indicated were appropriate. Rather, students are told 
that to involve oneself in rhetorical argument is to engage in trickery, flattery, and 
manipulation but not truth. Rhetorical argument is presented as something that one might 
use to “seduce” audiences, and which students ought to learn to protect themselves 
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against.68 Particularly where it concerns the use of emotion into argument, the 
characterization is scathing. Sections which include the “appeal to emotion” fallacy are 
often given such titles as “Irrational Appeals” and “Irrelevant Premises.”69 Emotion is 
described as the focus of “con artists, advertisers, politicians, and others whose stock-in-
trade is the manipulation of attitudes, desires, and beliefs.”70 To be sure, con artists, 
advertisers, and some politicians do attempt to manipulate and deceive others in their 
own ways. That these characters are the most commonly offered examples, however, is 
indicative of the negative outlook on rhetoric that underlies contemporary philosophy. 
Even those willing to admit that rhetorical features might be acceptable in an 
otherwise strongly dialectical argument cannot help but include implicit references to the 
idea that rhetorical argument is nothing but manipulative at its core. Lewis Vaughn and 
Chris MacDonald do precisely this. Rhetorical features, they say, can help to reinforce a 
strong, logical, factual argument. Indeed, this is exactly the position Aristotle advocates. 
On the same page that they express this position, however, a cartoon is included with a 
caption which reads, “Phew! Fooling [emphasis added] some of the people all of the time 
is damn hard work.”71 While even Aristotle had no problem admitting the possibility for 
rhetorical argument to be used in a negative and manipulative manner, the inclusion of 
this cartoon reinforces the stereotypical view that this is what rhetorical argument 
engages in most often. Rather than a neutral tool which may be used for good or bad 
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ends, this consistent presentation of rhetorical argument as being inextricably tied to 
manipulation strengthens the notion that a dichotomy exists between dialectical and 
rhetorical argument. Given Aristotle’s approach to these sorts of argument, though, it is 
perhaps the case that he would label this a false dichotomy.  
While Aristotle understood, and embraced, the effect that both ethos and pathos 
have on our potential acceptance of argument, the philosophical community since then 
has largely rejected their use. This, Gilbert says, is not the result of a belief that neither 
ethos nor pathos has an effect on our acceptance and rejection of arguments but that they 
ought not to.72 This presupposes, however, that we can abstract ethos and pathos away 
from all of our judgments about arguments and, as Aristotle has indicated, that is just not 
the case for everyone. Academic philosophy certainly trains us to do this as best we can, 
but for those who have no such training, ethos and pathos are taken into account, and can 
be powerful tools to make use of when attempting to persuade individuals to accept a 
position grounded in truth. 
I believe that the contemporary understanding of the dialectical-rhetorical 
distinction is misguided. Dialectical argument, I contend, is not superior and students 
should not be trained in such a way that leads them to believe this is the only sort of 
argument worth using. There are, indeed, instances in which dialectical argument is 
thought to be the preferable or superior approach and, in fact, misses the boat entirely. In 
these cases, I argue, rhetorical argument ought to be seen not as a manipulative strategy 
but as a legitimate tool in the persuasion of others. When we intend to persuade others to 
accept positions based in truth, we do ourselves a disservice to limit the strategies we 
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might employ to those acceptable in dialectical argument alone. If we strive to construct 
arguments using the best reasons available to us, our understanding of what constitutes a 
good reason must broaden.
40 
Chapter III: The Importance of Audience 
3.1. The Audience Factor 
According to Christopher Tindale, an argumentation theorist specializing in 
rhetoric, the most fundamental position from which we experience argument is as an 
audience. Humans are, he says, argumentative creatures. We recognize arguments for 
what they are, and offer arguments of our own, but it is as an audience that we first 
approach argument.73 Indeed, for Tindale, we can act as arguers only because we have an 
appreciation of what it is to be part of an audience. We know what it is to be addressed 
and to understand messages from the perspective of an audience, and because of this, we 
are capable of offering arguments to others that they might also understand.74 On 
Tindale’s account, people are constantly receiving and identifying arguments, claims, and 
instances of discourse for what they are because we are always “in audience” to some 
degree. We find ourselves “in audience” either as our normal inattentive state, or when 
something captivates us and demands that we recognize it explicitly. For Tindale, then, 
audience is at very heart of argument and, as such, is a component that we would do well 
to better understand. 75 
Despite this, however, Tindale indicates that there has been precious little focus 
on audience in Argumentation Theory thus far. Argumentation theorists have certainly 
given attention to arguments themselves, the arguers who construct them, and the manner 
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in which arguments are (or ought to be) evaluated, but the nature of audience has been 
largely overlooked.76 Even in the work of Aristotle and Chaïm Perelman, who offer two 
of the most systematic and influential accounts that seriously consider the rhetorical 
features of argumentation, Tindale says, an adequate account of audience is missing.77 
While both Aristotle and Perelman deal with audience more explicitly than many other 
argumentation theorists, Tindale is unsatisfied by how their accounts fail to deal with 
what he takes to be particularly difficult questions concerning the nature of audiences.78 
Argumentation Theory, he believes, has advanced to the point where developing a better 
understanding of audience, and giving consideration to the ways in which they react to 
arguments, is necessary. If argumentation comes naturally to us, and it is true that we 
approach argument primarily from the audience perspective, then audience is something 
that focus ought to be shifted toward.79 
Who is the audience for any given argument? Is it possible to identify one’s 
audience at all? If it is, how is it that arguers can accommodate, and subsequently 
persuade, their audiences, especially when audiences are characterized by high levels of 
diversity? How should arguments be evaluated in light of the importance of audience? 
For Tindale, these are the questions to which satisfactory answers have yet to be given.80 
At the core of these questions, and for Tindale what almost all problems concerning the 
audience can be reduced to, is audience identity.81  
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According to Tindale, identity presents such a major problem when it comes to 
audiences, partly because the audiences who we must construct arguments for can be 
incredibly diverse.82 Larger audiences can be composed of individuals whose identities 
are grounded in any number of characteristics, and this results in their adopting different 
beliefs, and the taking of different perspectives on various issues. Indeed, every 
individual’s view of their own identity can be incredibly complex and in a constant state 
of flux. According to Amartya Sen, Tindale says, we are almost always in deliberation 
about which aspects of our identity are more important than others, or more relevant to 
the topic at hand, and all of this affects the manner in which we react and respond to 
particular arguments.83 One individual’s race, class, or culture may sit at the very core of 
how they identify themselves, while another mighty identify primarily by their 
occupation, family ties, or religion, and yet another by their nationality, gender, or 
educational background. A parent might well have a different response to arguments 
concerning issues which involve children than someone with no intention of having 
children would. A parent with a strong religious background might react differently still 
from one with no religious convictions to speak of.  
As I see it, Tindale gives us good reason to think more deeply about the extent to 
which we should engage with audiences as active participants in argument, just as 
Aristotle thought we should.84 As he later says, Aristotle thought of audiences as being 
enveloped by the context of their lives but at the same time, accessible to the 
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understanding of arguers.85 Indeed, if Tindale’s initial thoughts on the importance of 
audience are correct, audiences are the most fundamental part of argument.86 The 
problems with which he concerns himself beyond this, however, seem to have played a 
part in there being limited focus on audience in Argumentation Theory.  
While I cannot hope to give an exhaustive account of audience, or to provide 
definitive answers to those questions indicated by Tindale as being crucial in constructing 
such an account, I do believe that audiences can be identified and accommodated. This is 
possible, I argue, through a common (but often misunderstood) process which most of us 
engage in, to some extent, nearly every day. While the complexity of audience identity 
might make it seem that properly engaging with audiences through argument will be a 
monumental task, I believe that my account will offer clarification as to how we can 
attempt to do this through far less complicated means than might initially seem necessary.  
Before dealing further with this, however, I would like to describe what I take to 
be two major problems with the traditional philosophical approach to argument. These 
problems arise when philosophers attempt to construct arguments pertaining to issues of 
public concern. I argue that this is precisely the result of a failure in those who prize 
dialectical argument to take seriously the importance of audience in the construction of 
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3.2. Two Problems with Dialectical Argument 
Because the goal in constructing dialectical arguments is that they be as logical as 
possible, philosophers believe that anyone exposed to a good dialectical argument ought 
to accept it. It is not the case, however, that we generally intend to persuade as many 
people as possible to accept our conclusions. Rather, the intention of most philosophers is 
to present a logically sound argument which those exposed to it cannot help but accept, 
precisely because it is logically sound. It is usually the case, then, that philosophers do 
not go out of their way to enter the public sphere with explicit intentions to influence as 
many people as they can.  
There does exist, however, a group of philosophers who might claim that they do 
seek widespread adherence beyond just that of their fellow academics. It is usually the 
case that these philosophers offer the arguments they do with the aim of “setting things 
right” as it concerns a particular issue of public concern, which affects actual people in 
the world. Issues that might qualify as being of public concern, in this sense, might 
include abortion, gun control (particularly in the United States), climate change, racial 
inequality, economic inequality (in both domestic and international contexts), and so on. 
These issues are those which affect almost all of us in some way or another, and which 
have a moral dimension that tends to be the focus of arguments concerning them. When a 
philosopher offers an argument regarding the morality of capital punishment, for 
example, they do so with the intention of reaching as many people as possible, so as to 
make that audience think more deeply about that issue. They believe that if they can 
persuade the vast majority of people to accept the conclusion for which they argue 
45 
(perhaps that we should not sentence others to death), then this will result in some good 
in the world. 
It is my contention, however, that dialectical argument, the chief tool of the 
philosopher, is largely inadequate in these instances. When it comes to dealing with 
issues that have significant implications for real people, I argue, dialectical argument 
drastically misses the mark: it is simply too disconnected from reality and the interests 
and concerns of the audiences most affected by these issues. This, I contend, is because 
philosophers do not reflect on (and are not required to reflect on) the audiences for whom 
these issues are most important. Consequently, questions about who these audiences may 
be, and what their lived experience entails, appear to be completely ignored. Despite what 
would seem to be an aim toward constructing arguments which engage with issues in the 
world, philosophers do not consider the people who form their audiences, and who their 
arguments are intended to affect. The lived experience of audiences is ignored from the 
perspective of dialectical argument and audiences are assumed to be moved to acceptance 
by the purely logical arguments normally prized by philosophers. But, when it comes to 
the general public, these arguments tend to be met not with widespread adherence. 
Instead, audiences react with confusion, apathy, and offense. If it really is the case that 
these philosophers intend to have some effect on the world, then dialectical arguments 
will not do.  
To be sure, a charge against philosophy on the basis of its being disconnected 
from reality is something of a cliché, and it is generally the case that such claims are 
vacuous and lack good reasons for our accepting them. I believe, however, that mine is a 
well-grounded critique. If we look closely at the manner in which philosophers use 
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dialectical argument to offer clarification about issues of public concern, then it becomes 
quite clear that their unwavering adherence to this method is incredibly problematic. 
There are, I believe, two major ways in which dialectical argument fails to speak 
to the audience when it comes to issues of public concern. First, dialectical arguments, 
when offered to broader audiences composed not just of philosophers, but of the general 
public as well, are ineffective to the point of being self-defeating. This problem arises due 
to the reasons that dialectical argument is legitimately allowed to invoke, according to 
philosophers. In ideal terms, these reasons should be as disassociated and 
decontextualized from particular circumstances as possible. When presented as part of a 
valid argument these reasons, assuming they are true, are supposed to compel audiences 
to accept the conclusion that they are offered in support of. Certainly, when it comes to 
audiences composed only of philosophers, these sorts of arguments generally do result in 
acceptance, assuming they are sound upon close examination.  
When dealing with issues of public concern, however, the audience is much 
broader than this. It is not just philosophers who will be exposed to arguments about 
capital punishment, euthanasia, abortion, famine, and so on. Rather, because these are 
issues which affect nearly everyone to some degree, everyone will be exposed to, or 
affected by, them in one way or another. But, not everyone considers the sorts of reasons 
prized by philosophers to be relevant or persuasive. As such, arguments which 
philosophers believe ought to compel us, will result in very little uptake when the scope 
of the audience is widened. I call this the “effectiveness problem.” If philosophers intend 
to have audiences accept the conclusions for which they argue, and act upon them if 
necessary, I contend that dialectical arguments are not the most appropriate tool. This is 
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because the audiences most affected by issues of public concern are incredibly broad, 
both as it concerns both the perspectives they take, and the reasons they consider these 
issues important. 
Second, precisely because of the reasons which dialecticians deem appropriate in 
constructing them, dialectical arguments fail to afford due respect to the lived 
experiences of the audience to which they are addressed. Again, because the goal in 
constructing dialectical arguments is to construct an argument which any rational person 
ought to be compelled to accept, the important and situational real-life factors that some 
individual, or group of individuals, might consider crucial to the issue at hand may be 
given short shrift or ignored entirely. Despite their offering direction regarding the 
manner in which we ought to live, those who craft such arguments abstract away as much 
of what makes individual audience members unique as they possibly can. Arguers are far 
more concerned with attempting to find the common denominator which will compel any 
rational person to accept their arguments than with considering potential audiences in any 
meaningful way.  
The implication behind this practice is that these reasons are unimportant. The 
reasons to which philosophers appeal are the proper reasons and all others are wrong, or 
in some way lesser than those which are purported to have universal appeal. According to 
this approach, there is a correct way of thinking about these issues and the way that most 
people think about them is not it. There is, to be sure, an extreme elitism lurking behind 
this approach. While, in these instances, philosophers are offering arguments to (and 
concerning) the general public, they remain convinced that the best way to look at these 
issues is as the philosopher does. That is, in the most logical terms possible. But, these 
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are profoundly important human issues, and the humanity which underlies them ought to 
be more deeply considered. These issues affect the lives of real people, but the experience 
that we have as real people is treated as having little or no value when it comes to 
arguments about them. Since this problem speaks to what I believe is a broad lack of 
respect for the reasons valued by members of our audiences, I call this the “disrespect 
problem.” 
It may certainly be said, however, that none of this is the goal of philosophers 
who employ dialectical argument regarding issues of public concern. It may be argued 
that there is no intention here to speak to the general public, or to have any effect on the 
world. Rather, these arguments may be constructed for entirely academic purposes and, 
as such, have only other philosophers as their audience. If this is true, then it is not 
problematic that there is no broader consideration for audience. With this being an 
option, it seems that one of two things must be true. Either it is the case that these 
philosophers are interested in issues of public concern for purely academic reasons, or 
they genuinely do offer arguments with the intention of having some effect on the world, 
and the people in it.  
If the former is true, it seems irresponsible to be dealing with these issues in 
particular. Many of the issues dealt with by these philosophers are of the utmost concern 
to the general public. They involve incredibly important questions, the answers to which 
may be drastically life-altering. If we are to engage with such issues, we ought to do so 
with a genuine intent to offer arguments which are crafted with respect to the real-life 
contexts of individuals to whom such issues are relevant. If the exercise really is purely 
academic, there are many other branches of philosophy where purely dialectical argument 
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is perfectly acceptable. There are areas of inquiry where these philosophers might be 
better suited to expend their efforts, and where the absence of intent to have a real and 
positive affect on the world at large does not detract from one’s efforts in any substantive 
manner. When it comes to issues of public concern, the stakes are too high to be dealt 
with by detached, academic arguments alone. 
If we are going to make arguments about issues of public concern, however, I 
believe that we ought to have tangible change as our chief goal, and I find it far more 
likely that this is a belief shared by most philosophers writing in this sphere. This appears 
evident when one looks at the manner in which philosophical journals that publish these 
very arguments are described. Philosophy & Public Affairs, for example, claims to have 
been founded on the belief that a philosophical examination of issues of public concern 
can “contribute to their clarification and to their resolution.”87 If this is how the work of 
philosophers writing about issues of public concern is described, then it would seem that 
there is good reason to believe that they really do intend to affect tangible change in the 
world. It is not obvious that their goal is to speak only of how things ought to be, in a 
manner heavily disconnected from reality. If this is the case, though, and philosophers do 
intend to help us deal with these issues in the best manner possible, then dialectical 
argument just will not suffice. When it comes to issues that are of widespread public 
concern, philosophers ought to take audiences into account, lest they engage in an 
exercise in futility. This is something that dialectical argument does not appear to allow. 
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3.3. A Defense of Abortion 
In order to show how dialectical arguments relating to issues of public concern 
can succumb to these two problems, I return now to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense 
of Abortion.” In this article, Thomson offers several arguments in favour of the moral 
permissibility of abortion. The first of these arguments is specifically constructed to 
refute what Thomson takes to be (and many other philosophers would agree) the most 
common and important argument offered by those who stand against abortion. According 
to these arguers, it would be immoral to abort a fetus on the basis that fetuses are 
supposedly persons and, as such, have a right to life which we must respect. This 
argument can be roughly reconstructed as follows: 
 
1. Fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. 
2. Every person has a right to life. 
3. While a potential mother may have a right to decide what happens with 
her body, this is outweighed by a fetus’ right to life. 
4. Therefore, abortion is impermissible; fetuses cannot be aborted.88 
 
 
According to Thomson, the first premise in this argument is generally the main 
point of contention. Pro-life arguers believe that if it is possible to establish that a fetus is 
a person, then it will naturally follow that abortion is impermissible. As such, these 
arguers focus primarily on establishing the truth of this premise. Pro-choice arguers, by 
comparison, usually aim to refute it. Both parties, she says, tend to focus on the 
development of the fetus and the point at which it ought (or ought not) to be afforded 
personhood.89 Pro-choice arguers might invoke analogies concerning the development of 
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other forms of life in order to show that fetuses are not persons. They might say, for 
example, that much like an acorn is not yet an oak tree, fetuses are not yet persons. They 
are merely “a bit of tissue that will become a person at birth[.]”90 A pro-life arguer, on the 
other hand, may appeal to the difficulty of drawing a line before which abortion is 
permissible but after which, abortion is impermissible. If we can only decide that a fetus 
is a person at some time or other for arbitrary reasons, they say, then we must accept that 
a fetus is a person immediately at the point of conception.  
Whether either of these common examples constitutes a good reason for arguing 
that a fetus is, or is not, a person (Thomson certainly does not believe that either does) is 
beside the point. What is important for Thomson is that both parties clearly believe that 
the issue of personhood is central to determining whether abortion is permissible. But, as 
Thomson accurately points out, the centrality of this premise in discourse concerning 
abortion has led to little progress thus far. It is unlikely that prospects will improve going 
forward, she says, if this premise remains central.91  
Instead, according to Thomson, we ought to focus on the third premise, which 
indicates that the right to life afforded to a fetus is stronger than a potential mother’s right 
to bodily autonomy. Despite its initially plausible appearance, Thomson argues that it is 
precisely because of a flaw in the truth of this premise that the argument does not follow 
as naturally as those offering it would have us believe. Indeed, even if we accept that 
fetuses are persons from the moment of conception, Thomson believes that it does not 
obviously follow that their right to life outweighs a mother’s right to bodily autonomy.92  
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She claims to show that this is the case by offering a famous thought experiment 
in which one wakes up to find themselves connected to a particularly important violinist 
in order to keep him alive for some period of time.93 No matter how long or short that 
period, Thomson says, if anyone were to find themselves in this scenario, they would 
think it absurd that they could not request to be detached from the violinist on the 
grounds that he has a right to life which supposedly outweighs their right to decide what 
will happen with their body.94 Thomson accepts that it may indeed be a kind act to remain 
connected to the violinist, but it is not clear to her that detaching oneself from him would 
be morally wrong by necessity.95  
But, this is the exact message sent by the pro-life argument. Potential mothers are 
told that because they are carrying a fetus which has a right to life, it would be immoral 
to abort that fetus. This is because, from that perspective, their right to bodily autonomy 
is not as strong as the fetus’ right to life. According to Thomson, though, if we would 
agree that it is absurd to request that one remain connected to the violinist for any period 
of time, then we must also accept that it is equally absurd to ask the same of any potential 
mother. Thus, Thomson contends that there must be something wrong with the seemingly 
plausible pro-life argument beyond just the controversial nature of fetal personhood. 
Even if one accepts that fetuses are persons who have a right to life, it does not 
necessarily follow that such a right outweighs a potential mother’s bodily autonomy. 
Thomson’s counterargument then, can be reconstructed as such: 
 
 





1. Fetuses are persons from the moment of conception. 
2. Every person has a right to life. 
3. But, a fetus’ right to life does not necessarily outweigh a potential 
mother’s right to bodily autonomy. 




Thomson continues by offering further analogies as well as responses to potential 
objections. For my purposes, though, a focus on this first argument is enough to show 
how her approach succumbs to both the effectiveness and disrespect problems. Before 
showing how this is the case, though, I must first say that Thomson’s is an excellent 
argument by dialectical standards. She identifies a problem with an argument offered by 
another party, shows how the opponent’s argument does not hold, given a condition they 
already accept, and responds with a counterargument of her own. This counterargument, 
if one accepts that Thomson’s thought experiment is analogous to the situation of 
potential mothers, seems to show that we ought to accept her conclusion. 
Yet, while Thomson’s is an impeccable example of an argument in the dialectical 
tradition, I contend that it fails to speak to the issue of abortion in any significant way for 
those who are affected by it most. When it comes to actual human beings who may 
entertain abortion as an option (and those who would be affected by their decision), I 
contend that arguments like Thomson’s have almost nothing to say.  
This criticism is one initially addressed by Janice Moulton in “A Paradigm of 
Philosophy: The Adversary Method.”97 Here, Moulton uses Thomson’s argument as an 
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example of one which focuses too heavily on showing another view to be necessarily 
wrong, and not nearly enough on what actual people in such situations must be dealing 
with.98 I concur with Moulton: rather than engage, in any significant way, with the 
reasons that individuals might have for considering abortion, Thomson’s argument is 
constructed in such a way as to ignore the myriad of complex and unique human 
perspectives on the issue. It is just not clear that those factors which present themselves 
as relevant to individual perspectives on abortion (in the context of our real lives) are 
explicitly considered. But, these are precisely the factors that are important to those who 
are faced with a need to decide whether abortion is the right thing to do in their situation. 
Thomson focuses on personhood and the rights which persons can be said to have 
on the basis that these features can be dealt with by appeal to logic alone and, thus, can be 
understood by any rational person exposed to the argument. As Moulton points out, 
though, all this argument amounts to is a conclusion which holds that abortion is not 
wrong just because a fetus might be a person.99 This argument would certainly be 
relevant to those who really do see personhood as a stumbling block when it comes to the 
morality of abortion. While the potential personhood of a fetus may be important to some 
pregnant women, however, it is not clearly the case that this is as central a feature as its 
prominence in philosophical discourse might lead us to believe.  
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that very few women considering abortion 
ask themselves whether their potential child is a person and, instead, focus on more 
practical features when making their decisions. In studies of over 3,000 women, surveyed 




in both 1987 and 2004, researchers at the Guttmacher Institute established that women 
considering abortion face a decision-making process far more complex than can be 
captured in an argument concerned with personhood alone. In fact, there is no indication 
that any of these women (all of whom chose to pursue abortion) explicitly questioned the 
personhood of their potential children. Rather, when asked to indicate the most important 
factors underlying their eventual decision, these women appealed to the way in which 
having a child would interfere with their education or employment, their inability to 
afford a child, and poor or non-existent relationships with the fathers of their children.100 
There is a consistent trend here over a period of nearly two decades which makes it clear 
that, for these women, the personhood of the fetus is not a factor in the decision-making 
process. Rather, these women refer to the real-life interpersonal implications (both 
positive and negative) of their potentially bringing a life into the world. 
This study is not the only one which shows just how broad the scope of the 
abortion decision is. According to a 2014 study published in the Journal of Women and 
Social Work, women who regularly fall victim to domestic violence are far more 
concerned about the violent situation that they would be bringing a child into, as well as 
the permanent connection between themselves and their abuser that would result from 
having a child with him, than they are with the personhood of the fetus.101 Indeed, the 
concept of personhood just does not arise as having been explicitly related to the decision 
made by any of the women in this study either. 
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These studies, to be clear, involve data collected only from women who 
ultimately did decide that abortion was the right option for them. In my research, I have 
been able to find no indication that studies have been done which focused primarily on 
women who considered and ultimately decided against abortion, or who had never 
considered abortion to begin with. Insofar as these women have been interviewed in 
connection with abortion, it does not appear that they were asked to share their decision-
making process. Rather, in the only study I have been able to find in which such women 
were surveyed at all, they were merely asked to share demographic information regarding 
their living situation, income, marital status, and so on.102  
Yet, while a deeper investigation into these perspectives may provide further 
insight, we can still draw an important conclusion from the data that is available. These 
studies tell us that for a significant portion of women, abortion is an issue far too complex 
to be captured by arguments which focus on one central concept and ignore all other 
relevant considerations. Real women who must decide whether abortion is the right thing 
to do, are likely to be concerned with far more than just personhood. They are interested 
in the real-life implications of bringing a child into the world. This is a perspective which 
has been largely ignored in philosophical discussion up to this point.  
Met with Thomson’s argument, a pregnant woman entertaining abortion as a 
possibility might rightly judge it as being of no relevance to her situation. That the fetus 
is, or is not, a person does not help her to determine whether she will be able to provide 
for the child, or if having the child will have a severe and negative impact on her life. The 
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personhood of the fetus does not guarantee that her partner will make a good parent, nor 
does it comfort her that her child will be properly loved if she is the victim of constant 
abuse, which she might fear that her child will become involved in as well. She may find 
herself terrified of the way others will judge her, or of the potential complications that she 
has been told can result from abortion. It is unlikely that any of these feelings will be 
relieved by Thomson’s apparent concretizing of the right for her to decide what happens 
with her own body. 
All of this is more than can be captured in an argument which offers little more 
than justification for the claim that abortion is not wrong just in case one believes that the 
fetus is a person. While this may be helpful to an intellectual elite, the general public 
experience this as a much deeper issue than arguments like Thomson’s can account for. 
Personhood is not an explicit issue to them in the same way that philosophers like 
Thomson would like to believe. Despite her best intentions, Thomson may have done 
little more here than solve a problem which does not exist. If women are more concerned 
with the real-life interpersonal implications for themselves, and their children, than they 
are with whether a fetus can be considered a person, perhaps philosophers ought to be as 
well. 
Thomson is certainly not alone in her misguided approach to the issue. Indeed, 
she is accompanied by most philosophers working with issues of public concern. While 
her argument is, I believe, an excellent one by dialectical standards, it does not lack 
detractors entirely. There are certainly philosophers who take issue with the quality of 
Thomson’s argument. Their critique, however, is not grounded in the same problems as 
my own: they do not say that Thomson’s argument appeals to the concerns of an 
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intellectual elite instead of the concerns of persons who must make decisions about 
abortion in the context of their real lives. Rather, they make the charge that her analogy 
between the fetus and the violinist is not a good one. They claim that the inconvenience 
of being attached to the violinist for nine months is not the same as the inconvenience of 
being pregnant for the same period, or that being kidnapped and attached to the violinist 
is only really analogous to pregnancies which result from rape.103 They choose, 
unsurprisingly, not to address the inadequacies of the very approach they make use of but 
to charge Thomson with having made use of that approach improperly. 
On my view, however, the extent to which Thomson’s argument fails to consider 
the lived experience of real people is exactly where it goes wrong. As I have shown 
above, there is a clear indication that personhood is not the central feature of the abortion 
issue for many of those who must consider whether they ought to have an abortion. For 
them, personhood is not the most relevant consideration pertaining to abortion. In fact, 
for many of them, it may not be one at all. The decision-making process of these women 
reveals an extensive assortment of other relevant considerations with which Thomson has 
not engaged. Rather, she overlooks these perspectives in service of showing that one 
specific view – that fetuses cannot be aborted because they are persons – is not 
necessarily logically sound.  
This is fine for the philosophically-inclined, or for those who really do take 
personhood to be the single most relevant consideration. But, for those who do not see 
the issue of abortion as one in which personhood is a central concept, this argument is of 
                                                          
103 Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” 49; Don Marquis, “An Argument That Abortion Is Wrong,” in 
Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, 3rd ed., eds. Steven M. Cahn and Peter J. Markie, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 755. 
59 
no use. It will not be persuasive for those who have already made up their minds about 
the relevance of personhood to abortion. Neither will it persuade those who believe that 
personhood is not the most relevant consideration. Those who believe that abortion is 
morally wrong on the basis of these other considerations will not be moved to think more 
deeply about why it might be the case that their perspective is incorrect or incomplete. If 
Thomson’s aim is to persuade those who take abortion to be morally impermissible that 
they ought to think otherwise, this argument will be unsuccessful for many of those who 
she attempts to persuade. 
Indeed, as I have noted, she recognizes this herself. She does not think that 
continued focus on personhood is likely to result in much progress being made on the 
morality of abortion.104 But, she has not moved far enough from personhood, in my view, 
to lead the charge toward such progress. Rather, she remains firmly rooted in the 
dialectical tradition, focusing only on refuting a popular opposing position.  
In making this the focus of her argument, though, Thomson does what many 
philosophers do with issues of public concern. She treats this incredibly complex issue as 
being dealt with adequately by an argument which ignores the relevance of any 
consideration other than personhood. Especially given that she has explicitly expressed 
worries concerning the continued focus on personhood, that Thomson does this anyway 
is troubling. This treatment of issues of public concern carries with it a particularly 
negative implication. If an adequate treatment of an issue like abortion is one which 
fixates on personhood alone, then the message sent to audiences is that other 
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considerations are not sufficiently relevant, nor important enough, to be examined and 
engaged with. 
But, such considerations are, for members of the audience, the most important 
factors in determining whether abortion is the right thing to do or not. A woman who 
finds herself pregnant with the child of a particularly abusive partner has far more to 
think about than whether the fetus she carries is, or is not, a person. She must worry about 
the extent to which her abuse will continue (or become worse) following the birth of her 
child, and whether her partner will abuse the child as well. Depending on the severity of 
the abuse involved in the relationship, she might fear for her life, and for the way in 
which her child would be treated were she to die. She may find herself considering 
adoption but unsure as to how difficult the child’s father will make this process for her, 
given that he, too, has parental rights. This is just a small sample of the deliberation that 
she would need to do, focusing only on her relationship with the child’s father. She might 
also have financial concerns, or religious convictions, or any number of other 
considerations that are relevant to the decision she will eventually make. 
Despite their significance to those making the abortion decision, considerations 
such as these are ignored. Real women, as well as their partners, do have to decide 
whether they should have an abortion or not. When they do this, they have much more 
than the personhood of the fetus on their mind. These perspectives are incredibly 
important in properly understanding the morality of abortion, and in persuading 
audiences to perceive the issue in one way or another. If arguers intend, as Thomson 
does, to persuade their audiences to accept that abortion is, in fact, morally permissible, 
then engaging with the reasons that people have for considering abortion is necessary. 
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Continuing to ignore these reasons, and reinforcing the implication that they are neither 
relevant nor important to the philosophical discussion, is highly disrespectful of the 
incredible importance that they have for people who may or may not choose to have 
abortions. Not only is Thomson’s argument one which will find little success in 
persuading those who have concerns beyond personhood when it comes to the morality 
of abortion, it is also one which sends a message to audience members. It tells those who 
take concerns beyond just personhood to be important and relevant considerations, that 
they are wrong.
 
3.4. Famine, Affluence, and Morality 
Unfortunately, Thomson’s argument is not alone in its inadequacies. Indeed, 
many of the arguments presented in academic philosophy as the best of their kind admit 
of nearly identical shortcomings. Perhaps an even more shocking example of this sort of 
argument is offered by Peter Singer in his famous 1972 essay, “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality.” Writing during the 1971 genocide in Bangladesh, Singer presents an argument 
in favour of drastic changes in the way that those of us living in relatively affluent 
countries view, and respond to, the overwhelming difficulties regularly faced by those in 
developing countries. 
Singer spends a significant portion of the essay discussing not just that we should 
be donating to some charity or other to help people in need but the manner in which he 
believes our moral outlook on charitable giving must change on the whole. Indeed, he 
says, it is a mistake to refer to our giving money and other sorts of aid to those in need as 
charitable or generous. Though some might say that charitable donation is a 
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supererogatory act, he says, this is not the case. Such labels bring with them the 
implication that the act of donating to charity is a good thing to do but that refusing to 
donate to charity would not be a bad thing to do.105  
For Singer, such an outlook is incorrect. Providing aid for those in need is not 
something for which individuals should be praised while others do nothing and are 
ignored rather than condemned. Indeed, it is our duty, he argues, to do much more to 
improve the lives of these people than we currently do. This, he says, rests on what he 
calls the “principle of preventing bad occurrences.” This principle, in its strongest 
formulation, holds that if we can prevent some bad occurrence, while sacrificing nothing 
of comparable moral importance, then we ought to do so.106 
As a means of clarifying, Singer offers the famous example of the drowning child. 
Suppose, he says, that you find yourself walking past a shallow pond and see a child 
drowning in it. To save the child, you must wade into the pond and muddy your clothes. 
Here, the death of the child would be an incredibly bad thing, while getting one’s clothes 
dirty is not in any way comparable. As such, it seems almost undeniable that anyone in 
this situation is bound by moral duty to save the drowning child. If, however, one would 
have to sacrifice their own life to save the child, it might not be the case that she does 
have this duty. In such a scenario, to sacrifice one’s own life to save that of another is to 
sacrifice something morally comparable.107 As such, this is not an action to which one 
would necessarily be bound by duty.  
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This understanding of the principle, according to Singer, is the one we ought to 
accept. Though he offers a moderate version of the principle (by which one need only 
prevent bad occurrences when doing so would result in their not sacrificing something 
morally significant), Singer says that he sees no good reason to accept it instead of the 
stronger formulation.108 The argument that Singer really wants to offer, then, can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
 
1. Suffering and death resulting from starvation, lack of shelter, and lack of 
medical care are bad.109 
2. If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening without 
sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, then you ought to 
do so.110 
3. It is possible for individuals in richer nations to prevent suffering and 
death in developing nations without sacrificing anything of comparable 
moral importance.111 
4. Therefore, individuals in affluent countries are obligated to prevent 
suffering and death in developing nations.112 
 
 
It follows from this version of the argument, Singer says, that individuals in 
affluent countries ought to be giving to the point of marginal utility. That is, we must give 
until the suffering we experience as a result of further giving would be equal to, or 
greater than, the relief that our giving would cause in developing countries.113 This means 
that individuals who donate in accordance with their duty to prevent bad occurrences 
would reduce themselves to nearly the same circumstances as those whose lives they 
hope to improve. This differs from the moderate proposal in that individuals likely would 
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consider donation resulting in marginal utility to be giving up something morally 
significant. Indeed, they would likely draw this line far before marginal utility. While this 
version of the principle certainly allows greater leeway for those who may feel 
uncomfortable giving nearly as much as Singer would like, he remains adamant that the 
stronger version is the one that we ought to accept as the correct explanation of our duty 
to prevent bad occurrences.114 Again, for Singer, there is no good reason to accept a 
version of the principle other than that which would result in marginal utility. 
One might think, though, that the principle of preventing bad occurrences, as 
Singer outlines it, is somewhat deceptive, given the apparent simplicity of the drowning 
child example. As Singer is quick to point out, the principle does not take proximity into 
account, nor does it seem to matter whether one is the only person capable of helping 
those in need, or if many others are equally capable. Singer is aware, however, that either 
of these factors might well be the basis upon which one could argue that they ought to be 
excused from obligations to provide aid to the less fortunate, or to particular members of 
that group.115 
In the first case, an argument might be made that one is not obligated to donate to 
relief funds for refugees in Southeast Asia, for example, on the basis that there are 
starving people without shelter much closer to home (perhaps in their very community). 
For Singer, though, this does not affect our obligation whatsoever. Assuming that we 
“accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, [or] equality,”116 he says, we 
cannot think that our obligation to help those in need is affected in any way by their 
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proximity. It may certainly be the case that we are more likely to provide aid to those 
nearer to us, but this does not mean we are any less obligated to those living on entirely 
different continents.  
Indeed, the only potential justification for thinking that our obligations would 
change, Singer says, is not relevant in modern society. One might well be right to say that 
their donations would do better in closer proximity on the basis that we are better able to 
determine what the less fortunate need when we are nearer to them. Unfortunately for 
those who would ground arguments in this point, Singer says, the increasingly globalized 
world in which we live makes it so that we can direct our aid to individuals anywhere 
else on the planet almost as effectively as those in our own neighbourhood. As such, he 
says, there seems to be no possible justification for discrimination based merely on 
geographical location.117 
Singer next argues that there is no significant moral difference between being the 
only person who can provide aid, and being one of millions in the same situation. 
Certainly, he says, there is a psychological difference in the two cases. One is apt to feel 
much less guilt in doing nothing when there are many others who could also have taken 
action than they will when they have no one to blame but themselves.118 But, he says, if 
we return to the example of the drowning child, the absurdity of the suggestion that our 
obligation is affected by the number of bystanders becomes clear. If one sees the 
drowning child before them but sees many others about the same distance from the child 
as themselves, who could also save him, Singer says, it would be absurd to think that 
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their obligation to save him is less than if there were nobody else capable of saving him 
nearby. The appeal to numbers, according to Singer, is merely a convenient excuse for 
doing nothing in instances where all of us are involved almost equally.119 
Singer further deals with two potential objections to the methods and goals for 
which he advocates. The first of these holds that providing aid to developing countries is 
not the responsibility of the individual but of their government. In fact, proponents of this 
position argue, when individuals choose to donate to privately run charities, they reduce 
the likelihood that their governments will do the same.120 Singer argues that this 
suggestion just seems implausible. It is more likely, he contends, that a complete lack of 
individual donation would indicate to governments that their citizens are uninterested in 
foreign aid. As such, governments would be unlikely to engage in providing aid, and 
would not force their citizens to do so either.121 Even if this is not true, Singer says, and 
individual donation does reduce the likelihood of higher-level aid, we would need good 
reason to believe that a lack of individual action really would bring about government aid 
to a significant degree. The onus should be on those who refuse to donate to show how 
their refusal will be more beneficial to those in need.122 This is not to say that Singer 
absolves governments of any responsibility to those in need. Rather, Singer believes that 
both individuals and their governments ought to provide as much aid as they are able. His 
immediate worry is that the potential for government aid serves merely as an excuse to 
avoid personal responsibility.123 
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The second objection addressed by Singer holds that an approach which focuses 
on donation is one which merely serves to postpone, rather than prevent, tragic outcomes. 
That is, according to proponents of this view, to donate money to famine relief is merely 
to postpone starvation, while to work toward effective population control would 
constitute a proper solution to the problem.124 Even if we are able to keep this generation 
of the least-well-off from starving, it may be the case that their children, or 
grandchildren, will eventually starve anyway. Thus, we must first focus on effective 
population control, and not on providing immediate aid.  
Singer does accept that a consistent rise in population is unsustainable, and that 
population control is the best way to prevent famine. But, he says, it does not follow from 
this that individuals in affluent countries have no obligation to provide aid for those in 
harsher circumstances now. Rather, the conclusion that Singer says we ought to come to 
here is that we would do better to prevent famine by shifting our focus toward population 
control. For Singer, this objection does not alleviate one’s duty to provide aid to those in 
need. Rather, it makes clear the direction in which this aid ought to be focused.125 
Here, just as with Thomson, the argument is excellent from the dialectical 
perspective. It is quite difficult to find logical issue with Singer’s argument, and he 
provides well-thought-out responses to potential objections. Indeed, Singer’s argument is 
often held up in academic philosophy as one of the very best in dealing with the issue of 
global poverty. Despite its dialectical merit, though, Singer’s argument also succumbs to 
the two problems previously outlined. Singer’s argument has an intentionally narrow 




focus, just as Thomson’s does, which is likely to alienate those exposed to it. It is likely 
to make them feel as though it does not apply to their lives because it does not account 
for their unique situation.  
Further, Singer offers his own perspective, grounded in an academic, logical 
understanding of the issue as the only proper perspective on the matter; one which ought 
to be accepted instead of any other. Indeed, his is a much more obvious example than 
Thomson’s argument when it comes to this second problem. Not only does Singer ignore 
the variety of differing situations in which audience members may find themselves, and 
thus how they might feel ignored by his argument, he explicitly says that there is no good 
reason to disagree with the strongest formulation of his principle of preventing bad 
occurrences. Even though he recognizes that the moderate version is likely to be far more 
palatable to a broader audience, like the one he hopes to persuade, he stands by the 
stronger formulation.126 
What Singer fails to appreciate when constructing his argument is the relative lack 
of concern that individuals may have for the duties that they are told they have by 
someone who does not appear to know what it is like to be them. Singer spends such a 
large portion of his essay offering justification for a duty that he believes the vast 
majority of his audience has in virtue of where they live and their financial situation. He 
subsequently orders them to take action with the threat of moral condemnation should 
they fail to do so.127 Given Singer’s closing comments, where he expresses the need for 
philosophers to take more seriously the conclusions they argue for, to the point of acting 
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on them, this approach seems somewhat strange. If this is indeed his goal, then an 
argument which succumbs to the effectiveness problem, and thus is self-defeating from 
the perspective of many, will be of little value. Singer has the increased challenge here of 
not just persuading his audience to accept a conclusion but moving them to act upon that 
conclusion so as to create real change in the world. The argument he offers, however, is 
one which will be acceptable only to an elite few (those persuaded by logic alone) and 
not by an audience quite so broad as Singer would likely prefer. 
Singer’s argument does not just lack effectiveness, it is also greatly disrespectful 
to the perspective of a great many individuals. Singer’s argument fails, in almost 
spectacular fashion, to understand the perspective of those so-called “affluent persons” 
who would experience this change. Whether he is right, and those of us who can afford to 
donate much more should do so until such a time that marginal utility is achieved, or not, 
he does not account for any of the reasons why an individual might be hesitant to do so. 
Unlike Thomson, and perhaps most arguments which admit of the disrespect problem, 
however, Singer does not simply ignore what members of the general public might 
consider good reasons not to donate significant amounts of their wealth. Rather, he 
explicitly denies that any of those reasons appealed to by members of the general public 
could be good reasons not to accept the strongest formulation of his argument.128  
This refusal to entertain alternate perspectives heavily undermines Singer’s 
argument and indicates a failure to appreciate that his detached, logical approach does not 
account very well for the lived experience of most members of the general public. There 
is, for example, no shortage of blue-collar workers who do whatever they can to provide 
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for their families and, despite this, are barely able to make ends meet. These are the sorts 
of people who are certainly more affluent than those living in (or nearly in) abject 
poverty but whose lives very well could be significantly altered by fulfilling the duty that 
Singer so adamantly believes they have.  
Indeed, these individuals may not even feel comfortable acting in accordance with 
the moderate version of Singer’s principle, were he willing to accept their doing so. 
Though it may seem insignificant to Singer to ask these individuals to donate the 
equivalent of £5 to charity, even this may be more than would be reasonable for some. To 
be sure, Singer might well consider those literally incapable of donating this (or any) 
amount as not sharing in the obligation to those living in poverty. It is not clear, however, 
that he accounts for those who may well be capable of doing so but who might believe 
that their obligations to their family, for example, are significantly more important than 
their obligations to total strangers.  
Such a view might be based in the perfectly reasonable concern that a person has 
for their partner, or that they have as a parent for their children. One might be more likely 
to do whatever they can to ensure that their family lives reasonably comfortably on the 
basis that these are the people they care about most. Even if they are just barely able to 
donate the sort of money Singer suggests, they may refuse to do so because they believe 
it would have a negative impact on those most important to them. Perhaps they are 
worried about contingent expenses that may arise in the future and wish to be prepared 
for such occurrences. They might consider charitable donation to be less important than 
being financially prepared if their family should find themselves in need of something 
like expensive medical attention or private tutoring. 
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What is important here is not whether this is a good reason to refuse to donate. 
Singer would certainly say that it is not, given that he advocates for the acceptance of a 
principle of impartiality which would not allow one to privilege their loved ones in 
making such a decision.129 What is important is that the individual who offers this as a 
reason sees it as a good reason. A responsible arguer ought to engage with this in a more 
respectful manner than Singer does. We ought to do our best to understand the unique 
situation that members of our audiences find themselves in given their individual lived 
experience. In so doing, we may be able to understand more deeply what approaches and 
tactics will be best suited to persuade individuals that providing such aid is the right thing 
to do, and that they really are able to donate significantly more than they might think, 
without their lives being negatively affected to a drastic extent as a result.  
Singer chooses not to do this. Instead, he explicitly discounts that any reason 
which does not fit into his argument could ever be important enough to reasonably excuse 
anyone from their obligation to prevent bad occurrences in the lives of their fellow 
persons. To take either the more common dialectical approach of ignoring such reasons, 
or pre-emptively undermining them, as Singer has done, however, is remarkably short-
sighted, both practically and morally-speaking.
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Chapter IV: Empathy and Argumentation 
4.1. A Suggested Solution 
What I hope to have made clear in the above is that the effectiveness and 
disrespect problems really do exist in philosophical argumentation. It is important to 
realize that these problems are not uniquely related to Thomson or Singer’s arguments, 
nor are they related just to arguments concerning abortion and global poverty. Rather, 
they are part of the traditional philosophical approach in general, due to the attachment of 
philosophers to dialectical argument. These arguments, because they are often cited as the 
best of their kind in philosophical circles, merely serve as excellent examples of what 
philosophers generally take to be an adequate treatment of issues of public concern.  
From the perspective of the audience, however, this is the wrong approach. There 
is more to the lived experience of audience members than purely logical accounts can 
hope to speak to. When it comes to problems such as global poverty and abortion, there 
are a multitude of differing perspectives which are grounded in reasons that, for those 
who hold these perspectives, are good reasons. These positions are held not because 
individuals fail to grasp the logic surrounding the issue but because factors beyond those 
captured by a detached, universal account are also relevant and important to real people. 
If my charge against philosophy is valid, as I believe it is, and if the intention of 
philosophers, when dealing with issues of public concern is to affect the world in a 
positive manner, as I believe it should be, then we must make changes in the way that we 
deal with such issues. We must find a way to accurately capture the facts surrounding 
these issues, yes, but we must also remain cognizant of their deeply personal 
characteristics. While the dialectical approach is well-suited to many areas of 
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philosophical inquiry, when it comes to dealing with issues of public concern, the 
argumentative strategies we employ need to be far broader. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this change is the need to understand why 
individuals adopt the perspectives they do. When it comes to some of the most 
controversial and divisive issues, the gaps between differing perspectives often appear 
insurmountable and this tends to result in philosophers dismissing some perspectives, and 
the beliefs in which they are grounded, as unworthy of any discussion. The steadfast 
commitment of philosophers to the dialectical approach has directly led to their giving 
such positions short shrift, either because they lack the desire, or the ability, to deal more 
explicitly with them within the dialectical tradition. As I have shown above, philosophers 
like Thomson and Singer deal with important and personal issues such as abortion and 
global poverty by ignoring many of the reasons that such issues are important to people. 
The actual reasons that women may struggle with when deciding whether to have an 
abortion and the reasons that people do not donate to charity nearly to the degree that 
they may be duty-bound to, are ignored or labelled as being not good enough to consider 
whatsoever. Because of this, audiences are bound to wonder what arguments like these 
have to do with them and the situations in which they find themselves. 
If we hope to address issues of public concern as the human issues they truly are, 
however, engaging with those real, human reasons in a direct manner is of the utmost 
importance. When philosophers refuse to make attempts at understanding members of our 
audiences, we greatly decrease the likelihood that an argument asking them to see things 
from the philosophical perspective will ever gain traction. But, this is exactly what we 
should consider our goal when discussing issues of public concern. Whether it is the 
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treatment and prevention of global poverty, the increased accessibility of abortion for 
those who wish to seek it, or any number of other major changes that we would like to 
bring about, if philosophers hope to make a positive difference in the world by offering 
arguments, then we ought to aim to persuade as many people as possible to accept the 
positions for which we advocate. If this is to be the goal of philosophers, however, we 
cannot entirely disregard individuals on the basis that they adopt a perspective of which 
we do not approve. We need to understand what has led them to adopt the positions they 
do, and engage with them in a more comprehensive manner. 
I contend that, in dealing with such issues, philosophers would be best served by 
the adoption of an approach in which explicit recognition of the audience is a central 
element: one not unlike Aristotelian rhetorical argument. Offering arguments which will 
be both effective for, and respectful of, our audiences requires that we recognize and 
react to them as individuals with lived experiences which inform the perspectives they 
adopt. Further, we must engage with the reasons which underlie these perspectives rather 
than ignoring them, or dismissing them from the outset, as has been the dominant 
approach thus far. 
By what means, then, can we accomplish this? How is it that philosophers ought 
to go about recognizing their audiences in the construction of arguments? How do we 
become the ideal Aristotelian rhetorical arguer who can see all possible means of 
persuasion available to them? I believe that the answer is empathy. Empathizing with 
members of our audiences can provide us with incredibly deep insight into the way that 
they approach issues of public concern. Rather than present arguments meant to appeal to 
a perfectly rational audience in an attempt to persuade people, we can use empathy to 
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determine what it is that they take to sit at the heart of these issues. We can gain a deeper 
understanding of how people view issues of public concern, and why they take the 
positions they do, by attempting to see these issues as they do, from a point of view 
informed by their own lived experience.  
Pinpointing the beliefs that underlie perspectives on crucial issues such as these 
and engaging with those beliefs, precisely because they are what the audience takes to be 
important, is an approach which is certainly more respectful of audience members as 
actual individuals with lived experience. More than this, the arguments that we can 
construct when we gain such insights, because they engage with the components of issues 
of public concern that our audiences take to be at the very core of these issues, will have 
a greater likelihood of being effective. If we accurately determine what it is that truly 
grounds the positions which individuals adopt concerning abortion, global poverty, and 
any number of other major issues, then we will be better capable of presenting arguments 
which speak to them as people. 
 
4.2. Empathetic Argument  
In his Coalescent Argumentation, Michael Gilbert offers an alternative to the 
traditional dialectical (or, as he refers to it, the “Critical-Logical”) approach to argument. 
While argument is a crucial part of the lives of nearly everyone, he says, the traditional 
approach has a habit of going wrong due to the emphasis it places on opposition, as well 
as a lack of recognition that argument is a situated endeavour engaged in by individuals 
who do not always argue in a strictly logical manner.130 As an alternative to this 
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approach, Gilbert offers what he takes to be a sort of argument which is both more 
creative and cooperative. He calls this “coalescent argument.”131 The traditional 
philosophical approach, he says, pits arguers against one another. Each arguer must 
attempt to identify, and focus on, what is wrong about the other’s argument. 132 One 
arguer “wins” the argument when she persuades the other to accept the position for which 
she advocates. 133 Instead of this, coalescent argument aims at having arguers identify 
points of agreement and disagreement between their apparently conflicting positions.134 
Ideally, Gilbert says, successful coalescent argumentation would result in two positions 
which appear to be at odds coming together (coalescing) in such a way that agreement 
can be achieved between advocates for both positions.135 
The approach that Gilbert advances here bears some similarity to my own. We 
both are highly concerned with the state of contemporary philosophical argument to the 
point that we argue in favour of alternative and broader methods. We both advocate for 
deeper engagement with audiences as individuals whose positions are grounded in who 
they are as real people. My project differs from his, however, both as it concerns the 
extent to which empathy is explicitly invoked, as well as what I take to be the process, 
and the goal, of successful empathetic argument.  
First, while Gilbert indicates that empathy is very likely the most crucial element 
in a coalescent approach to argument, he deals only briefly with the concept.136 While I 
do believe that he provides an account which can form the basis of a very rich 
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understanding of the concept, my intention is to provide a much more explicit description 
of exactly what I take empathy to be, as well as the way that it can be used in, and 
subsequently benefit, philosophical argument.  
Secondly, Gilbert and I have different processes and goals in mind when it comes 
to the alternative sorts of argument we suggest. Again, the goal of coalescent argument is 
to minimize disagreement between competing positions. The hope is that these positions 
might coalesce and lead their advocates to find a non-conflicting option on which they 
can mutually agree, and which might not previously have been considered.137  
This is not the goal of empathetic argument. Rather than being interested in the 
lived experience of others in order to identify points of agreement and disagreement, the 
empathetic arguer attempts to understand the positions of those who comprise her 
audience, as they (audience members) understand them, so that she can construct 
arguments with their perspective explicitly in mind. She does this not so that she and her 
audience can come to an agreement on the issue at hand but so that she may be better 
capable of persuading them to accept the position for which she argues.  
It should also be said that empathetic argument can be applied in a variety of 
different circumstances, whereas Gilbert seems to indicate that coalescent argument is 
primarily dialogical in nature. In his examples of how coalescent argument might be 
applied, Gilbert presents situations in which only two individuals present their positions 
to one another in a conversational manner. This comes after he consistently refers to 
those who enter into this sort of argument as dispute partners, and indeed, he does 
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indicate that he places a strong emphasis on dialogical argument involving only two 
persons from the outset.138 Empathetic argument, as I envision it, can be applied in more 
circumstances than this. To be sure, an empathetic arguer might enter into argument with 
only one other person. In these instances, she empathizes with this individual, and using 
the information gathered through empathy, attempts to persuade them to accept her 
position. She might also address much larger audiences than this, though. These 
audiences might be composed of many quite diverse individuals. In such cases, the 
empathetic arguer attempts to empathize with her audience as a whole. She tries to 
understand, for example, why those who believe passionately in a right to own and bear 
arms share in this belief. Subsequently, she constructs her argument with this 
understanding in mind. The process by which she empathizes with a large audience may 
not be as intimate as with an individual, and testing whether her arguments have been 
successful may be different as well, but I believe that empathetic argument is equally 
applicable in either case. 
Before describing empathetic argument further, however, it is important to be 
clear about what I mean by empathy. Over the past 150 years or so, many different and 
conflicting positions have been offered as to what we should understand empathy to be, 
and so to avoid any potential confusion, it is crucial to be clear about what I take empathy 
to be. As I see it, empathy is a process by which we project ourselves into the situation of 
others and attempt to understand the way in which they see the world. For the purposes of 
my project, what we attempt to understand is how they view particular issues of public 
concern and what it is that they take to be important about such issues. In order to clarify 
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further, I believe that Gilbert’s description of empathy can be quite helpful. Though his 
treatment of the concept is rather brief, I believe that Gilbert’s terminology serves as an 
excellent stepping-off point upon which to build a rich account of empathy. Properly 
understood, this account of empathy is one which is not particularly difficult to apply to 
philosophical argumentation.  
Empathy, Gilbert says, is both an attitude and an act of will which “requires 
paying attention to the entire range of communicative and epistemic modes available in 
order to project oneself into another’s position.”139 This can be a difficult task, Gilbert 
says, especially as the disagreement between two positions grows, but this gap is 
precisely what makes empathy so crucial.140 Despite its potential importance to his 
project, though, Gilbert does not say any more than this about what he takes empathy to 
mean.141 I believe, however, that a closer look at the two components of empathy to 
which Gilbert refers, will be very beneficial in coming to an understanding of what 
empathy is.  If we understand the empathetic attitude and the empathetic act of will more 
fully, I argue, it will become quite clear how empathy can be reconciled with 
philosophical argumentation. 
Looking first at the empathetic attitude, it is perhaps unsurprising that I contend 
that there are two crucial features of this attitude that are worth a closer look: respect and 
humility. While these two features do not account for an exhaustive picture of all that the 
empathetic attitude might include, I argue that they are the two features which most 
clearly identify the disposition we must embody when attempting to empathize with 
                                                          




others. If we can have the sort of respect for audience members that I suggest, and can be 
humble concerning the instances in which dialectical argument alone falls short, then I 
believe that we will be well-positioned to practice empathetic argument. 
As I have said several times, the sort of respect that is most important for 
philosophers to have is a respect for the real people that our audiences are composed of. 
We must respect them as individuals with lived experience which informs what it is that 
they believe and the good reasons (from their perspective) that they have for adopting 
particular positions on issues of public concern. While philosophers may not evaluate 
these reasons and beliefs in nearly as positive a light ourselves, this does not mean that 
we can assume their irrelevance as we are often wont to do. Rather, we must identify and 
engage more deeply with them. These reasons and beliefs may indeed be erroneous in 
nature; they may be grounded in logical error or factual inaccuracy, or may be rooted in 
emotion. But the proper response to this is not to dismiss them outright or to address our 
audiences with a blunt and careless accusation of their being wrong in hopes that they 
might see the light that is our own “correct” position and adopt that instead. 
I previously gave the example of an individual who felt that Singer does not 
account for the circumstances of their life in his argument. This might be the sort of 
person who believes that providing for their family, and being prepared for contingent 
expenses is more important than making charitable donations. Perhaps they worry that 
their children will require private tutoring, or that their family members will someday 
need expensive medical treatment, and this keeps them from donating generous amounts 
to charity. 
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As I have said, this may not be a good reason from the philosopher’s point of 
view. It may be factually true that such individuals could comfortably provide for their 
families while, at the same time, donating a significant amount to charity. I do not agree, 
however, that it follows from this that we may simply dismiss reasons such as these as 
being irrelevant or lacking merit. But, this is exactly what Singer does. Before such 
reasons are even offered to him, Singer pre-emptively denies that there could be any 
point in offering them, saying that there is no good reason to accept the moderate version 
of his principle of preventing bad occurrences as opposed to the strongest formulation.142 
This is the sort of assumption that we cannot continue to make in these scenarios; it is an 
assumption which is just not indicative of an empathetic approach to argument. 
The respect that we need to have is such that we would be inclined to think more 
deeply about the audience before us, and about those positions which are commonly 
attached to particular issues of public concern. This is so that we may try to understand 
the fundamental beliefs which underlie competing perspectives regarding these issues. 
We must be willing to put in the effort required to discern what it is that makes 
individuals adopt, and stand fervently by, perspectives which do not seem reasonable to 
us. The manner in which we deal with such issues, and engage with those who adopt 
these perspectives, must indicate a respect for the reasoning they have done, no matter 
how we evaluate it, if we have any intention of affecting, rather than annoying them. 
A further part of this respect will have to include what I take to be a very 
important distinction, one which I believe philosophers fail to appreciate far too often 
with each other, and certainly outside of philosophical circles. This is a distinction, 
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initially made by Andrea Nye, between analyzing and reading, or as I prefer to say, 
listening for and listening to.143 As philosophers, when we listen for, we are attempting to 
pinpoint claims within an argument which we can undermine in order to show that the 
argument is somehow faulty. This practice is certainly acceptable, to some degree, and it 
would be wrong to deny its importance to the dialectical process. Indeed, this is a 
fundamental aspect of that process; listening critically so that we might identify 
inaccuracies and make them known to the arguer so that they may amend their argument 
accordingly. This process, then, is a primarily judgmental one aimed at determining 
whether specific arguments are worthy of consideration.144 It is often the case, however, 
that being critical becomes the philosopher’s only goal when we engage in this practice, 
and unfortunately, this can lead to major misunderstandings about the content of 
arguments being presented. Some philosophers will take specific terms or phrases as 
triggers, and immediately begin to think through the various ways in which they can 
incorporate them into the construction of an objection. Again, because this is a 
fundamental part of dialectical argument, and because dialectical argument is something 
in which we are so well-trained, this happens in many cases as nothing but a habit. 
This tendency is one that I believe we ought to move away from, to some extent, 
both in philosophical circles and when it comes to attempts to empathize with audiences 
comprised of the general public. Rather than listening for by default, I argue that we must 
listen to. Instead of listening with the intention to be as critical as possible, we must 
become equally skilled at listening to understand the position presented to us as a 
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considered whole. While it can be incredibly easy to identify what we think to be an error 
in an argument that needs attention, and to dwell on it, I believe that we need to minimize 
the extent to which we do this.  
This is especially true when it comes to interactions with those who are not 
trained in philosophy to the degree that some of us are. Rather than trying to pinpoint the 
errors in logic made by members of the general public and focusing primarily on them, 
we must think more deeply about why those claims, which we take to be erroneous, are 
considered to be sufficient from the perspective of this audience. It is not necessarily the 
case that they do not understand what they are saying, or that they are easily convinced 
by falsehood. There is often more to it than that, and it is a good arguer’s responsibility to 
determine what this is. As Gilbert references the distinction made by Nye, which bears 
striking similarity to the distinction I make here, I believe it would be fair to say that this 
serves as a good example of at least part what he means when he says that paying 
attention to the full range of communicative and epistemic modes is a necessity.145 
Further, we must move away from the unfortunately elitist mindset with which we 
tend to approach argument. As I have said previously, there is a belief among 
philosophers that people ought to be compelled, by the power of logic, to accept the best 
examples of dialectical argument. Regardless of who might make up an audience, or who 
might be presenting the argument in question, so long as an argument is properly 
dialectical, philosophers assume that it will be accepted.  
In those instances where negative reactions occur, however, it is often the case 
that blame is placed on the audience; this is especially the case when audience members 
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are not as well-trained in philosophy as the arguer. The assumption is usually that people 
reacting poorly would be compelled to accept the argument in question if only they were 
better trained to understand why they ought to do so. If the argument itself is indicated as 
being to blame, though, the immediate assumption is that it must be in some way faulty in 
terms of its logic. It simply does not live up to the dialectical standard in the way that it 
initially appeared to. Surely, an argument which does not admit of these flaws would be 
accepted by those who understand why they ought to accept a proper dialectical 
argument.  
Rarely, if ever, is it suggested that this sort of argument just does not resonate 
with this sort of audience, and that a different approach may be necessary. Because 
philosophers use dialectical argument as our main method of inquiry in the search for 
truths, we have come to see this sort of argument as the best and only way of arguing 
properly. We do not consider that an alternative approach may be more effective, because 
we do not see any other approach as being good enough to employ. But, an alternative 
approach does exist, and we already understand that it has great potential to persuade. We 
simply need to broaden our approach to include rhetorical argument with empathy at its 
core just so long as it sits at the proper end of the rhetorical spectrum. 
This is not to say that I deny the importance of logic. Indeed, I concur with the 
Aristotelian belief that even in employing rhetoric, we must continue to see logos as 
being at the heart of our arguments. Rather, I contend that philosophers must practice 
humility both in the way that we approach perspectives with which we do not agree, as 
well as in the construction and presentation of arguments. Philosophers must be open to 
the possibility that there may be value in perspectives (and the beliefs in which they are 
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grounded) that we would not normally accept or engage with beyond identifying their 
logical errors and supposed falsehoods. We must recognize that we may not have all the 
answers, and that views which would normally be dismissed may be worth engaging with 
more deeply so that issues with which almost all of us are concerned can be better 
addressed. 
In addressing such issues, philosophers must also appreciate that there are many 
individuals for whom a purely logical argument will not be sufficient. Such arguments 
will often fail to be persuasive, and may even offend those to whom they are offered. 
Rather than take the elitist view that there is only one way to present and receive 
arguments, and that others must come to prize the purely logical approach as we do, we 
need to recognize, as Aristotle did, that there is nothing inherently wrong with 
broadening our approach so that we may better speak to the concerns of the masses. The 
general public is not in any way lesser than philosophers because they are not trained to 
value logic as we do, and we cannot insult their intelligence by continuing to act as if this 
is the case. They are simply different when it comes to the sorts of arguments, and the 
kind of reasoning that they recognize as persuasive. 
So, this is what I take the empathetic attitude to be in a philosophical sense. It 
consists in a respect for those whom we present philosophical arguments to, and for the 
lived experience afforded to them as real human beings. A respect for the intelligence of 
our audiences, and for their ability to select good reasons upon which to ground the 
positions they take on various issues of public concern. A desire to do the work necessary 
to understand the perspectives held by our audiences, to determine what these 
purportedly good reasons are. A willingness to address these reasons through an approach 
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to argument that is more broad than dialectical argument; a sort of argument which has 
the capacity to be more immediately persuasive in contexts where our audience just is the 
general public. 
What, then, do we do with this attitude? If the above is the mindset that we must 
bring to the table, what actions must philosophers take so that we may engage with 
audiences through empathy? This is the empathetic act of will, and it is the process by 
which we may come to determine what competing positions on issues of public concern 
consist in. My explanation of what this act of will looks like is one that, admittedly, 
appears simple, and which should not strike anyone as being something new and unheard 
of. The empathetic act of will, as I see it, is a thought experiment. It is a conscious 
projection of oneself into the position of the individual or group with whom we are 
attempting to empathize. We must imagine what it is like to be in the position that they 
find themselves in, as well as the way in which they feel about, and would react to certain 
facts relating to, the issue at hand. Through this process, we can come to propose, and 
subsequently test through argument, hypotheses concerning the content of the 
perspectives held by audience members.  
This should not appear in any way foreign because it is something that many of us 
already do almost naturally. We often come across people in our daily lives who stand 
out for whatever reason, and make attempts to understand what it must be like to be them 
in the situation that they are currently in. During a morning commute, you might see a 
young mother catch the bus while pushing a two-seat stroller and holding the hand of a 
third, older child. She may struggle to find a place to fit the stroller, her older child, and 
herself amongst an already crowded bus. Her children may begin to sob audibly, and she 
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may become visibly agitated. At this point, many people will think to themselves (or 
aloud) that this woman should get a car to avoid the trouble of taking all these children on 
the bus at such a busy time of day. Others, though, will recognize that this is an excellent 
everyday opportunity to empathize with another individual.  
One might attempt to put themselves in this mother’s shoes. They might try to 
understand what it must be like to find oneself in the position of needing to take public 
transport, and having to bring these children along so early in the morning. While many 
can find the appearance of a mother pushing a stroller full of children on an already 
crowded bus to be an annoyance, empathizing with her situation may push them to re-
evaluate the way in which they may previously have passed negative judgment. It is 
certainly possible that one would come away from an empathetic thought experiment 
such as this with a feeling of compassion toward the mother. This feeling of compassion 
might affect their current and future actions concerning people in similar situations. This 
is the sort of experience that happens to us quite often, and I believe that we can apply the 
information that can be discovered through this process to the construction of arguments.  
It must be said that there may be slight differences in terms of the way we attempt 
to empathize in our daily lives compared to when we do so to construct persuasive 
arguments. For example, when we engage in the empathetic thought experiment with the 
mother on the bus, we do not tend to test our conclusions. If we speculate that the mother 
is in this situation because she is a single mother who must care for, and support her 
children with no other assistance, or because she is physically or mentally incapable of 
driving, we do not usually ask her whether any of this is the case. It is certainly possible 
that this is not the case. She may be very well-off and capable of driving but chooses to 
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avoid doing so because she worries about the safety of her children in a smaller vehicle, 
or as a kindness to the environment. Perhaps the reason that we do not test these 
hypotheses is because we do not see the absolute success of attempts at empathy in these 
instances as being the most important factor. Rather, we might think that what is 
important in these instances is how our attempting to empathize can affect us and our 
interactions with others. 
This is somewhat different when applying empathy to argument. What I take to be 
the most important factor in these cases is the way in which attempts at empathizing can 
improve the quality of the arguments we construct. As I have said, empathizing with 
others can allow us to learn more about them, and the way they approach important 
issues, so that we can construct arguments that speak to them. We may be wrong about 
those things that we think we learn about them, just as we may be wrong about the 
circumstances of young mother’s life, but we will be capable of testing whether this is the 
case through the very arguments we hope to improve.  
At this point, I would like to provide what I believe to be a helpful example. It is 
one thing to explain what the empathetic attitude and act of will are, and another to show 
how embracing these will look different from the manner in which philosophers normally 
approach issues of public concern. Despite what may have appeared above to be a 
demanding account, it is my hope that, through this example, it will become clearer that 
the differences between the traditional approach and empathetic argument are not nearly 
so monumental. 
Take, then, an audience composed of those who have a fervent belief in the right 
to own and bear arms. Gun ownership is an incredibly controversial topic, and one of 
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great public concern. Whether individuals should be free to purchase any sort of gun they 
choose, and to what extent, if any, the purchasing process ought to be regulated are hotly 
contested in public debate in America. Unfortunately, little progress has been made on 
this issue. It simply appears that those who wish to enact policies of stricter gun control 
are incapable of persuading those who passionately support the Second Amendment to 
the United States Constitution to alter their positions in any way whatsoever. 
Now, how might a philosopher deal with such an audience, assuming that she 
wished to persuade them to support some semblance of gun control? To use a 
commonplace example, I imagine that she might present facts and figures indicating the 
danger that can result from widespread gun ownership. Like Singer, she might suggest 
that if we can prevent unnecessary deaths from occurring, then we ought to do so. She 
might then point to statistics indicating that, in the United States, where it is easy to 
procure a gun compared to many other countries, 64% of all homicides in 2016 were gun-
related. She may contrast this with figures concerning England and Wales where 
procuring a gun is much more difficult, and where only 4.5% of homicides were gun-
related in approximately the same time period.146  
Given all of this, she might suggest that making it more difficult for some 
individuals to acquire a gun is at least one way in which many unnecessary deaths might 
be prevented and, so, she might argue, restricting the ability of some individuals to buy 
guns (or to purchase particular types of guns) is a route that ought to be explored.  
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While this is an extremely quick overview of what has become an exceptionally 
routine argument on the topic of gun control, from as neutral a perspective as I can 
imagine, and assuming that one would be persuaded by logic alone, it is not a bad 
argument by any means. But, it is an argument constructed in the dialectical tradition, and 
it aims at appealing to any given person regardless of the way in which their unique lived 
experience may affect their point of view when it comes to this issue. From an objective 
point of view, we are supposed to see that a smaller population of firearms in one country 
appears to result in fewer gun-related killings, and from this, assume that a reduction in 
firearms in another country would have similar results. Given the degree to which the 
situation in England and Wales is similar to the situation in many other countries with 
comparatively fewer guns than can be found in the United States, there is at least 
something to this argument. 
For those individuals who are strong believers in the right to bear arms, however, 
an argument such as this simply presents them with facts, of which they may already be 
aware but which do not change anything about what they may have experienced 
themselves that led them to take the position they have. So, it is not surprising that this 
sort of argument is historically ineffective and often met with negative response. As with 
the typical reaction among non-philosophers to arguments like those given by Thomson 
and Singer, people are bound to wonder what this argument has to do with them. What 
account does it take of their lives and the circumstances that lead them to believe that 
owning a gun is necessary? 
Compare this with the course of action that I believe an empathetic arguer might 
take. First, the empathetic arguer takes account of who her audience is. In this case, it is 
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Americans with a strong attachment to the Second Amendment right to bear arms. She 
recognizes that these are individuals who claim that it is their inalienable right to own 
guns of all sorts, and who believe that nobody can infringe upon that right. She realizes 
that they consider this to be a fundamental part of who they are as people. To be fair, this 
much is likely also known to the philosopher taking the traditional dialectical approach. 
Indeed, I would suggest that it is common knowledge among almost everyone. The 
difference, however, is that the traditional philosopher seems to do nothing more with 
this information than merely recognize it as a fact about a certain subset of individuals. 
Again, the argument that the philosopher intends to present is one with universal appeal, 
and which does not prioritize any specific group. It is because of this attempt at universal 
appeal that philosophers do not feel the need to engage more deeply information like this, 
which pertains to a one specific group. 
The empathetic arguer, on the other hand, must delve deeper into the position held 
by her audience. She must ask herself what it is that attaches her audience so fervently to 
this belief and why that is the case. She may recall having heard passionate believers in 
gun ownership ground what they perceive as a need to own guns in a desire to protect 
themselves and their families. She might wonder what it is that they are protecting 
themselves from, or why they feel responsible for taking this protection into her own 
hands. It is at this point that the empathetic arguer begins to move toward the act of will 
that is projecting oneself into the perspective of another, attempting to see and understand 
their position as they do. She must attempt to discover their underlying beliefs, as if they 
were her own, while ensuring that her own judgments and biases are not allowed to enter 
the picture. 
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She might begin to suspect, for example, that what lies at the heart of this belief is 
a deep-seated fear. This might be a fear that attack is always imminent. That home 
invasion is extremely prevalent and that one must be prepared to act quickly in these 
cases to protect themselves, and their families, so that they do not have to rely on the 
police to do so. The police, they might think, do not care about people like them, or will 
be unable to come to their assistance in a timely enough manner to prevent incredible 
harm. This fear may be, to some extent, irrational. It could be, for example, that her 
audience succumbs to what psychologists call the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut 
which results in our believing that the probability of some events is higher than it is 
because we are more easily able to recall particularly powerful examples of such 
events.147 So, reports of a particularly gruesome home invasion, resulting in multiple 
deaths, might lead people to believe that such events are incredibly common, and that 
they need to prepare for when it inevitably happens to them. Statistics show, however, 
that home invasion resulting in any sort of violence, let alone death, accounted for only 
7% of the nearly four million average instances of home invasion which occurred in the 
United States from 2003-2007.148 This something that the empathetic arguer must engage 
with. She cannot choose to ignore this fear because it may be irrational. She must tailor 
her arguments in such a way that she does not just take that fear into account, and engage 
with it explicitly, but so that it is made evident to her audience that she recognizes its 
importance to them.  
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The empathetic arguer still presents facts to her audience, but she presents facts 
that she has good reason to believe will resonate with them. Rather than more general 
figures, she may instead appeal to statistics concerning instances in which her audience 
would suggest that having a gun benefits them. She might reference studies indicating 
that the rate of homicides related to home invasion is incredibly low, despite what her 
audience may have come to believe.149 She may appeal to the greater potential for 
children to harm themselves, and others, in a household where they can access guns 
(despite common parental misconceptions about whether their children know where guns 
are stored in the household).150 She might point to the instances in which individuals have 
killed members of their own families, mistakenly believing that someone had broken into 
their home.151 She may attempt to persuade her audience that they would be doing a 
better job of protecting their families if they were to choose some non-lethal means of 
defense, rather than exposing them to the immediate, and almost guaranteed, lethality of 
firearms. 
This, of course, may not be what this specific audience needs to hear either; it 
may not resonate with them for many reasons. Perhaps they do recognize the rarity of 
homicides occurring during home invasion, or it may be that this group of gun owners, in 
particular, does not feel fear as the empathetic arguer has hypothesized. As I see it, 
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however, errors such as this do not constitute a problem for the empathetic arguer so 
much as they present an opportunity. Just because one group of faithful believers in the 
right to bear arms might not be persuaded by this argument does not mean that none will. 
It may indeed be true that the empathetic arguer needs to concoct another 
hypothesis for this group and present to them another argument. Because she embraces 
the empathetic attitude, this is something that she will be open to doing. She will not see 
this error as a failure but as an opportunity to better understand, and construct further 
arguments aimed at, this kind of audience. The more that she learns about her audience, 
the better her arguments will be for them. Persuading all, or most, passionate gun owners 
may require that she construct a whole host of arguments pertaining to the dangers of 
widespread gun ownership. We must remember that these are incredibly complex issues, 
and be open to the idea that they will not be solved by a single argument, no matter how 
remarkable it may be. 
Ultimately, what the empathetic arguer must do is embrace rhetorical argument. 
She must recognize the importance of the emotional situation and reactions of her 
audience by engaging with pathos. She may attempt to arouse feelings of sympathy in her 
audience, for those whom they wish to protect, in order to help them see facts which 
might otherwise be of little importance to them. In recognizing and engaging with their 
emotions, she appeals to ethos by showing her audience that she understands the way in 
which they approach this issue, that she recognizes that they are not violent, illogical, or 
evil people. They are afraid. She needs to show them that they can trust her to deal with 
this issue in a way that recognizes what is important to them, rather than in a manner 
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which seems to pass judgment on them, and which tells them what they ought to consider 
important because what they now consider important is not important at all. 
But, the empathetic arguer cannot engage with either ethos or pathos in an 
exploitative manner; she may not abuse their trust or cause them greater fear to 
accomplish her goal. She must keep logos at the heart of her argument. She must not 
succumb to the pressure of trading in falsehood just because doing so may persuade a 
greater number of people more quickly, and with far less resistance, than truth. She must 
not engage in the deceit and manipulation that philosophers have come to connect 
inextricably to rhetorical argument and which now, perhaps more than ever, is painfully 
evident in the world. She must take the neutral tool for which Aristotle advocated and use 
it virtuously. The empathetic arguer must persuade her audience through truth but in such 
a way that these truths resonate with them, engage with their lived experience, and speak 
to them as real human beings.
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
Having shown how I believe that empathy can be compatible with, and improve, 
philosophical argumentation, I would like to take this opportunity to address the reason 
that this thesis is titled as it is. It is almost unquestionably the case that modern 
philosophy in the West owes a great deal of credit to Socrates for its very existence. It is 
difficult to imagine where philosophy would be today if not for Socrates’ having urged 
those around him to question their assumptions on all subjects and take nothing for 
granted. Indeed, were it not for Socrates having taught Plato, and Plato subsequently 
teaching Aristotle, much of the groundwork for Argumentation Theory might not exist at 
all. 
Despite the incredible influence he would have on philosophy, however, Socrates’ 
methods were not without their controversy during his lifetime. If there is one thing that 
nearly everyone knows about Socrates, it is that he was a notoriously irritating figure. 
Throughout the dialogues of Plato, Socrates finds himself in conversation with people 
who have deep-seated, and previously unquestioned beliefs, about justice, knowledge, 
piety, virtue, and so on. As I have said previously, Socrates’ companions in philosophical 
discussion would offer what they took to be the proper understanding of one of these 
concepts, only for Socrates to ask them a question which, when answered, would show 
how their understanding was deeply flawed. A second definition might be offered, and 
subsequently subjected to the same scrutiny, with similarly disappointing results. This 
back-and-forth would continue through multiple attempts at defining a concept, often 
with different members of a group giving their own definition in the expectation that 
theirs would be the one with which Socrates found no problems. Unfortunately, though, 
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definitive answers were not often found through discussion with Socrates. While he 
would certainly help his audience understand why particular definitions of a concept were 
faulty, he was not in the business of telling them what it was they should believe instead.  
Socrates’ methods were certainly frustrating for many of those he encountered 
and, to be sure, he was aware of the reputation he had garnered. He knew that people 
were easily irritated by him, and that he had made enemies both of those who he had 
shown to lack the wisdom that they claimed to have, and of those who believed that he 
was corrupting the youth of Athens by teaching them to do the same.152 When offering a 
defense against his potential execution, Socrates describes himself as a gadfly attached to 
the great and noble but sluggish horse that was Athens.153 He was sent as a gift by the 
gods, he says, to criticize the beliefs of Athenians and awaken them from a slumber in 
which they valued material wealth more deeply than wisdom, truth, and the state of their 
souls.154 That he annoyed Athenians was merely his way of motivating them to engage 
with, and question, these beliefs, and this was something that he believed he had been 
divinely chosen to do.155 In somewhat poetic fashion, though, the Athenians chose to 
swat away the gadfly that had caused them such frustration, sentencing Socrates to death. 
This picture of Socrates, in which he annoyed those around him to such an extent 
that he was executed, is one we know all too well. What is often overlooked, however, is 
his tendency to act in, and compare himself to, a quite different role. Like his mother had 
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been, Socrates thought of himself as something of a midwife.156 As he tells Theaetetus, 
though, this is something about which he is particularly secretive, and perhaps this is why 
few Athenians thought of him as anything but a gadfly.157 Like a midwife attends to a 
woman’s body and aids her giving birth to a child, Socrates says, he attends to the souls 
of men and assists them in discovering wisdom and truth within themselves.158 It is his 
most important duty, he says, to put the ideas of his students through every test available 
in order to determine whether their beliefs are erroneous, or grounded in truth.159 This is 
why he engages in the questioning and criticizing of the beliefs of others. He is 
attempting to discover whether what they are “pregnant” with is an idea that captures 
truth and wisdom, or if it is a “false phantom” which must be aborted.160 But, while the 
gods have sent him to provide this assistance to others, Socrates himself is barren of 
wisdom or truth of his own, in much the same way that a practicing midwife can no 
longer bear children.161 Those who wonder why Socrates did not provide definitive 
answers about some concept or other, and why the conclusions to his discussions were 
not always satisfying, need only look here to understand. Socrates cannot provide either 
of these, for he believes that he does not have them within him. 
What I believe we see here is an important insight into Socrates’ teaching 
philosophy. While many may think of him as an annoyance, and as someone who only 
makes himself known so that he can show them how they are wrong about all that they 
believe, he certainly took his philosophical project to be something more. The methods 
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which resulted in him garnering such a negative reputation among Athenians were not 
only a test of the veracity of the beliefs of those he spoke with. They were also a test of 
these individuals as thinkers. In taking on the role of a midwife, Socrates appears to have 
been all too happy to assist others in developing knowledge grounded in truth, but this 
was something that he would only do for those who he recognized as being capable of 
learning through his methods.162 Those who did not pass such tests, he says, he would 
refer on to others, like the sophist Prodicus, whose teachings they might be more 
receptive to.163 
An important part of the way that Socrates’ puts the role of midwife into action 
involves an acute ability to recognize who his audience is. Whether they will be the sort 
of person who he can persuade, and who is open to discovering the wisdom and truth 
within themselves through the methods that Socrates employs. Further, Socrates is quite 
skilled at recognizing the emotional state of his audience, and at reacting appropriately to 
whatever it is his methods have made them feel. As he says, it is he who brings upon 
them the “pains of labour” and he who alleviates them.164 
An excellent example of this process is found in Meno. Here, Socrates engages in 
discussion with Meno concerning virtue. They attempt to determine what virtue is, and 
whether one comes to be virtuous by being taught, through practice, naturally, or by some 
altogether different means.165 In keeping with the way in which most discussions with 
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Socrates tend to proceed, Meno offers definition after definition of virtue, all of which are 
subsequently shown to be faulty by Socrates.166  
At this point, Meno finds himself utterly lost and pessimistic as to the potential 
outcome of this conversation. He tells Socrates: 
 
… I used to hear that you are always in a state of perplexity and that you bring 
others to the same state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me, 
simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. … [Y]ou seem … to 
be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes anyone who comes close and 
touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of effect on me, for 
both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have no answer to give you. Yet I 
have made many speeches about virtue … very good speeches as I thought, but 
now I cannot even say what it is.167 
 
 
Two things are evident here. First, as I have said already, Meno is utterly 
confused at this point. What he previously thought he knew about virtue has been so 
thoroughly questioned and debunked that he cannot begin to think any further about what 
it might be. He is frustrated with Socrates for having put him in this position and put this 
pain upon him, and Socrates recognizes this. But, there is something beyond what Meno 
has explicitly shared that Socrates recognizes as well. That is, the previous notions of 
virtue which Meno had been given by Gorgias, and accepted on the grounds of Gorgias’ 
authority alone, have now been abandoned.168 While Meno is pessimistic about the extent 
to which they will be able to determine anything valuable about virtue, he is also now 
something of a blank slate where virtue is concerned, and can be more easily led by 
Socrates toward discovering wisdom and knowledge of his own.  
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But, Socrates now needs to draw Meno back into discussion, and alleviate the 
pain he has caused, so that Meno does not end the conversation here. While Meno is now 
aware of his ignorance, Socrates must give him good reason to continue thinking about 
virtue rather than giving up. Meno does not think that any progress can come in this 
conversation and, indeed, wonders whether there is any point in trying to define 
something which one does not already understand fully.169 Socrates combats this 
skepticism by famously showing that one of Meno’s slaves can be taught to recall 
geometrical knowledge held within his soul merely through a series of questions posed to 
him.170 The result of this is a much more optimistic Meno, a Meno who is immediately 
ready to resume discussion concerning virtue, and who, by the end of the dialogue, has a 
clearer vision of what virtue is and a desire to think more deeply about the concept.171 
We see here the midwife truly in action. While the gadfly is the side of Socrates 
who causes frustration aimed at readying individuals for deeper thinking, the midwife 
recognizes and eases such pains in order that they might also be willing to do so. But, 
what do the two sides of Socrates have to do with this thesis? I believe that there is an 
important analogy to be made here between Socrates’ two sides and the two approaches 
to philosophy that I have previously discussed.  
The contemporary philosopher that I have described is the gadfly. She presents 
logically sound but decontextualized, arguments regardless of the specific audience 
before her. She expects that such arguments will successfully persuade audiences 
precisely because good logic is supposed to be compelling. While she is respected for this 
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approach among her peers, just as Socrates was respected by Plato and others who 
genuinely appreciated his teachings, it is an approach which has little traction with 
audiences composed of non-philosophers. 
Where Socrates balances the gadfly with the midwife, the contemporary 
philosopher does not seem to do so nearly as much. While Socrates did not think himself 
capable of giving those he conversed with explicit answers, the contemporary 
philosopher does exactly this. As I have said, it is implicit in her approach that if her 
audience does not agree with her methods it is a failing in them, and not in her approach 
to argument. Because she is trained in philosophy, she knows the proper way to deal 
philosophically with questions about abortion, global poverty, racial inequality, the death 
penalty, gun ownership, and any number of other incredibly important public issues. She 
speaks past what her audience takes to be important because decontextualizing these 
issues is what she thinks is the proper way of dealing with them. She causes the same 
pains that Socrates said he could. She annoys and offends those whose perspectives she 
ignores. But, she does not follow this with the audience recognition of the midwife. She 
does not draw her audience back into the conversation, from which she has already 
alienated them, in order to persuade them to think differently about the subject at hand, as 
Socrates would have. 
To be clear, I do not contend that Socrates was the empathetic arguer which I 
believe is necessary in dealing with issues of public concern. Indeed, many of the issues 
that fall into this category today would have been meaningless to Socrates and, as such, it 
is difficult to speculate, and impossible to pass any judgment, about how he might have 
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dealt with them through argument. Nonetheless, I believe we can take something 
important away from his midwifery.  
Though his methods were quite different from the empathetic arguer described 
above, Socrates did accommodate audiences. He recognized that it is important to dispel 
falsehoods and misinformation, to be sure, but he was cognizant also of the need to go 
beyond mere identification of such inaccuracies. Socrates’ goal was to give people good 
reason to think more deeply about their unquestioned beliefs. While he did push them to 
recognize when their beliefs were inadequate, the midwife in Socrates was always at 
work to recognize when he had pushed someone too far. When this occurred, he did not 
allow frustrated individuals like Meno to walk away, defeated and confused, without 
attempting to draw them back into discussion. Rather, he recognized the emotional state 
they were in and attempted to show them that all was not lost simply because their 
previous beliefs had been so thoroughly undermined. He wanted them to think more 
deeply, yes, but he knew that his efforts would be futile if they served only to anger or 
upset those with whom he discussed philosophy.    
This is something that contemporary philosophers do not do nearly often enough. 
Philosophers point out falsehoods and offer purported truths through argument, but as I 
have said, they do not give individuals any reason to accept these arguments other than 
those which only the philosophically-inclined would be willing to accept. They do not 
engage with their audiences as being composed of people who have unique lived 
experience. Philosophers irritate and offend, just as Socrates did, but too often, the upshot 
provided by the midwife is missing. 
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Again, the climate in which philosophers find themselves today is markedly 
different from the one in which Socrates was positioned. The issues of public concern 
with which we must grapple are far greater in number, and seem much more personal, 
than those that Socrates attempted to assist others in dealing with. Indeed, it is difficult 
not to view the divide between differing perspectives as being hopelessly large. But, I am 
optimistic about the potential for empathetic argument to make positive change as it 
concerns argument pertaining to these issues. Our methods will not be the same as 
Socrates’ were, but the underlying appreciation for the emotional state of one’s audiences 
and the recognition of a need to draw them toward the subject matter being discussed are 
no less applicable today than they were for Socrates. I believe that we can channel this 
approach into argument if we attempt to empathize with our audiences, and see issues of 
public concern from their perspectives. If we meet them on their own terms, and engage 
with what they take to be important about these crucial issues, I believe there is a greater 
opportunity to be persuasive, and to identify misinformation, and outright falsehoods, in 
an effective manner. This approach, I believe, will have far more positive results than the 
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